


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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

AMERICANS' VIEWS ON CIVIL DEFENSE
IN THE COLD WAR CONTEXT: 1966

BY

JIRI NEHNEVAJSA
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR



FOR

OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF ARMY

OCD-OS-63-48

DECEMBER, 1966

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-- Report Summary --

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REPORT SUMMARY

This report examines Americans' views on civil defense in the cold war context, based on the 1966 Survey on Civil Defense and Cold War Attitudes conducted on behalf of the University of Pittsburgh by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. This national block sample of 1,497 Americans were interviewed in February and March, 1966.

In looking at the results of this study, we have the option of scrutinizing the bits and pieces of the national mosaic of thoughts on peace and war, on disarmament and Civil Defense, on Vietnam--noticing that some changes take place when we compare particular pieces of information with corresponding data from 1964 or 1963 or some other year. Alternatively, we have the option of accepting the risk of being profoundly mistaken, yet, attempt to impute "meaning" which transcends any single piece of information. Perhaps to harvest some benefits from both of these basic options, without necessarily avoiding all the pitfalls, we have chosen both lines of attack. We are considering only those ramifications of the data which have a bearing on programs of civil defense. Thus we shall not seek to evaluate the further implications of the cold war conflict per se, or of the war in Vietnam in its own right.

Over the many years of civil defense-related research, 1950-1966, the data show remarkable consistency in public evaluations of the programs. All along, Americans have been highly supportive of civil defense and actual expressions of opposition have remained at around the ten percent level. Throughout, between two in three and nine in ten of our citizens have gone on record as favoring measures of civil defense.

This amounts to a form of "national consensus," with stability over time, in both major ways in which we like to think of the concept. For one, two-thirds majorities are sufficient in our political process to arrive even at the most exacting decisions: such are the majorities in support of civil defense. Secondly, no single group of Americans or some relevant social category can be singled out as standing in opposition and thus essentially against the overwhelming numerical majority. Neither support nor opposition are clearly patterned in that it is impossible to identify any segment of our body politic and make it coincident with the occurrence of negative sentiments vis-a-vis civil defense.

Of course, some population segments are overrepresented in their positive sentiments, such as younger people, or women, or Negroes,

or working class Americans. But the differences are in the intensity of their favorableness rather than in its direction.

Nor are the forms of opposition and support apparently patterned by expectations or desirabilities associated with the termination possibilities of the cold war. This may be accounted for by the fact that highly desirable outcomes are not seen very probable (e.g., disarmament), and highly unwanted outcomes are not exceptionally improbable (e.g., a central war). Be that as it may, anticipations--when viewed as both probabilities and desirabilities--regarding the ending of the cold war do not predict the direction of responses to programs of civil defense. The pattern of overall favorableness is as strong among Americans fervently desirous of disarmament as it is among others. Indeed, this may be further reenforced by the consensus which prevails with regard to the important role of civil defense against hazards of nature and man-made disasters short of the possible nuclear cataclysm.

In one sense, however, the positive and negative responses are patterned indeed: by far most Americans who are favorable to any program of civil defense tend to be favorable to all alternative ones although the intensity of their feeling may occasionally vary; and those relatively few Americans who are opposed to civil defense, tend to be opposed to all measures of civil defense and not just to particular systems (e.g., private versus public fallout shelters; fallout versus blast shelters; protection versus evacuation).

We cannot but conclude: there is little reason to suppose that the number of opponents of civil defense programs will grow almost regardless of how opposition arguments are stated or enacted; there is little reason to suppose that the level of support will increase, simply because a kind of "ceiling" seems already operative. There just are not many more "friends" for civil defense to be gained; and there are few "opponents" who could be converted--precisely because the unfavorable sentiments are more general in character and not specific to particular features of particular civil defense systems. This should not be construed to mean that the level of activity of supporters or of opponents or both could not undergo fairly drastic changes, and we shall deal with this problem subsequently. But it does mean that the basic attitudes will remain just about the same with minor oscillations back and forth and whatever activism makes itself felt, it will draw upon the already prevalent sentiments rather than importantly changing them (in either direction).

The basic consistency of positive American attitudes toward civil defense is, in many ways, quite remarkable. Apparently,

it has not been affected by the fluctuations in the international environment. Thus it has remained stable in a world of the Korean conflict, development of Soviet thermonuclear weapons, Hungarian revolution, Berlin wall, Chinese occupation of Tibet, Chinese invasion of India, the coming of Castroist Cuba, the Cuban missile crisis, the gradual escalation of the Vietnamese war, and China's developments on the nuclear weapons front.

The underlying evaluations of civil defense have also been unaffected by changes in the nation's administration. The same sentiments seem to prevail in the days of Johnson as did in the Kennedy era, in the years of Eisenhower, and in the remaining months of the Truman Presidency. Nor have shifts in Soviet leadership had a great effect. The results for Stalin's regime are not different from the findings of the triumvirate days (Khrushchev, Malenkov, Bulganin), of the Khrushchev interregnum, and of the Brezhnev-Kosygin age.

There are compelling reasons to argue that the fundamental assessments of civil defense will remain impervious to further changes in the international climate. This means that subsequent escalation, or for that matter, deescalation, of the conflict in Vietnam is unlikely to lead to different data concerning civil defense from the information we have to date. Nor will further modest steps on the arms control and disarmament spectrum, such as the recently negotiated treaty concerning weapons testing in outer space, or a plausible treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, change these views. The 1963 test ban treaty similarly had no profound effects on the expressed attitudes and dispositions.

At the same time, certain classes of events might induce great increments in activity related to programs of civil defense. For example, we would expect a temporary increase in the nation's civil defense-relevant activism should China get involved in the Vietnamese war at least to the extent of that country's involvement in Korea. But as soon as it were clear that the implicit threat is unlikely to actualize and a larger war is not imminent, the sense of urgency is likely to subside, and with it, the level of active participation and involvement.

Hence, the attitudes lead to different commitments to action depending on the character of the international environment. A low level of activity is typical when most shifts in the international scene are gradual, and as long as conflict patterns are chronic. A high level of activity is more predictable when extreme and rapid changes take place which either sharply increase the seeming probability of war, or increase the uncertainty about the future.

The nation's feelings about civil defense have not undergone significant changes even in the context of major shifts in the civil defense programs themselves. There are no noticeable frequencies of conversions of opponents into proponents and vice versa in the face of changes from evacuation plans to stress on family shelters to an emphasis on the construction of public fallout shelters to marking and stocking programs based on surveys of available sheltering.

Indeed, even though significant increments in civil defense readiness have been achieved through such modest programs, as well as rather widespread training and education efforts, both arguments of supporters and the arguments of opponents remain largely unaffected. This means, of course, that we do not expect that current and subsequent efforts will have a different impact either. Neither the Home Shelter Survey Program nor the Community Shelter Planning Program should be expected to alter the pattern of the nation's thinking, and since most of the thinking is highly positive, little difficulty can be expected in connection with the implementation of such programs. In a similar vein, we do not think that the evidence would warrant the conclusion that a national decision to go ahead with anti-missile missile systems would make Americans less receptive to civil defense and passive defense systems. Nor would we claim that they would become more receptive than they already are.

The nation's mass media, particularly newspapers and magazines, have given civil defense at least as much bad publicity as they have been somewhat more positive. Indeed, negative reporting has tended to be somewhat predominant. Despite this, the views of Americans about civil defense have remained just about the same over the years.

Over two thousand organizations in the country claim to be "peace organizations" with a dedication of the pursuit of paths toward peaceable settlement of world problems. Of these, hundreds have been quite active with respect to various national and international issues. Many have linked programs of civil defense to militarism, to war-mongering, to aggressiveness, and have sought to promulgate an unfavorable image of civil defense. The nation's sentiments have not been altered in the process.

The favorable viewpoint has been independent of the manner in which the various questions have been worded, and the kinds of responses which were implicit in the questions. Asked whether they want civil defense, or more of a program than at any given time seems to exist, Americans give a strong affirmative answer.

Probed whether they are favorable or unfavorable to civil defense in general, or to fallout shelter programs, they select favorable alternatives. Asked whether they agree or disagree with civil defense measures, the respondents choose to agree, and usually quite strongly so. Asked about the desirability of civil defense measures, desirable responses dominate undesirable ones in a ratio similar to other response patterns. Different basic sampling designs, probability samples or block samples, produce essentially identical results as well. Thus the consistent pattern of evaluations cannot be attributed to characteristics of particular research designs or to particular research instruments.

There can be no question that civil defense actually fares very well with our body politic. This seems enough to indicate that as long as the risk of war persists, the need for civilian preparedness will remain altogether apparent to our public, the desirability of actual steps toward enhanced readiness will be maintained at a high level, and arguments about negative psychological, social and international costs of taking such measures will remain unacceptable, or perhaps, not credible.

The actual assessment of war probabilities, however, has bearing on the sense of urgency with which advances on the civil defense front tend to be viewed. Under acute threat, this feeling of urgency translates itself into action. Under conditions of high tension but in face of no seeming increment in war probabilities, the "normalcy" situation does not dictate such direct involvement although favorable sentiments and attitudes are maintained, and receptivity to civil defense programs remains high.

What are some of the implications of these findings? In a situation in which the question is often asked as to how to make civil defense "acceptable" to our people, these might sound like unexpected results. However, they are less surprising than the persistency with which the question is asked in face of overwhelming and repeated evidence that it need not be raised at all. This means, of course, that public education and information programs to essentially "sell" civil defense as such are probably not worth the cost not because it is difficult to convince people of the value of the effort, but because they already are convinced of it. Any increments in the level of attitudinal support can be only negligible due to the already existing support "ceiling."

We see, furthermore, no educational or informational program which would convert the few, if vigorous, opponents. This is so simply because the opposition sentiments are couched in a broader ideological conception of the world; because the unfavorable sentiments are independent of the kind of civil

defense effort undertaken and encompass all of them; because the negative attitudes have been maintained in about the same proportion of Americans in the face of changing international scenes, changing domestic as well as Soviet leadership, and changing programs of civil defense.

Yet, when opposition arguments do come into the open, it may well be crucial to enlighten the public about the fact that such views characterize but a fragment of our society, not negligible but nonetheless small. This seems important mainly because an individual who has a rather favorable view of civil defense may feel in a minority in face of strong, organized and vocal opposition. No one can really convince Americans that civil defense programs are, or are not, provocative to the Soviets. This is simply due to the fact that Soviet interpretations of world affairs are not very well known to us no matter how much we would like to say that they are, and thus no proof can be provided one way or another. However, it is quite possible and useful to assert that only a few Americans actually believe that civil defense programs are provocative to the Soviets whether, in fact, they are or are not.

Under conditions of relative "normalcy"--a notion which encompasses changing international tensions, chronic conflict patterns, and many modest oscillations of the conflict level--the nation's body politic is not highly sensitive to civil defense-related activity of any kind. This implies that the low sense of urgency has an impact on the willingness of the public to acquire information which might be vital to increase personal, family and national survival under actual conditions of nuclear hazards. This is a veritable dilemma. For we are led to conclude that no information program can significantly increase the nation's knowledge about warning, about protective behavior, about recovery requirements, in such "normal" environments since the relevance of the information to immediate life situations of most people is quite remote. Perhaps the only kind of information program that has saliency in a time-less sense is the one which keeps educating our people about ways in which relevant information could be obtained in an immediate pre-attack environment, and that such information is available and will be made available.

This also implies that we cannot expect, in the more "normal" international climates, that the public would begin levying demands on the nation's political leaders to enhance civilian readiness. In this situation, we see no rationale which would induce Americans to attempt to trigger off more active pressures for more civil defense at the national, or state, or local levels. This makes the task for policy makers particularly

exacting and difficult since, in the area of civil defense as in many others, they must truly lead rather than respond to expressed national demands. Furthermore, even if the level of public activity were increased--as in crises environments--it is not altogether clear whether we would be ready with plans to respond to popular demands, to utilize large masses of volunteers, to launch immediate programs. This, in turn, means that crises, as unwanted as they are in any event, are opportunities from the vantage point of civil defense measures. But they are possibilities rather than genuine opportunities until such time as national planning has reached a stage of preparedness for crises, and particularly, preparedness for a nationwide response to crises.

All in all, this further leads to stressing the necessity for contingent planning such that crisis situations, if they occur, can be made use of in a positive sense. This is easier said than done. Certain situations are crises or "acute" problems precisely because they represent a qualitatively different level of international threat. It is not altogether certain whether, in such circumstances, some forms of civil defense mobilization would not aggravate the crisis itself. But these are problems of national policy to which we are not addressing ourselves, and such dilemmas in no way negate the obvious desirability of planning even if the crisis-related plans were never carried out.

Now the data strongly suggest still another conclusion. If simple behavior is expected and sought of our people, compliance can be anticipated at the levels commensurate with the research findings: that is, at least two in three and as many as nine in ten of our people will generally act in the desired manner. Now behavior is "simple" in this sense if it calls for relatively direct actions or short, and rather self-explanatory, action processes which do not entail the use of a great deal of time, energy or funding. Furthermore, it is "simple" if the end-products of the behavior are clearly visible so that the acting individual himself has a good feeling for the relation between the ends of his actions and the actions themselves as means toward such ends. Thus, if the actions seem to "make sense."

This should account for the expectations and, in the states thus far surveyed, the fact of high compliance with such programs as the Home Shelter Survey. It levies simple requirements. The objective is obvious. The time and energy investments of each individual involved in the survey are low.

The same conclusion also accounts for the rather high compliance of the nation's landlords with the Marking and Stocking Program.

The logic of the effort is both simple and compelling and the grounds for non-compliance--certainly on the basis of opposition to civil defense--rather few.

A call for volunteers which would specify the concrete activities of volunteers, the time and energy involvement expected of them, a simple procedure for volunteering and for discontinuing their activities, would similarly be heeded by large numbers of Americans. A personalized call for volunteers would lead to as high a level of compliance as our data indicate--with as many as seven in ten of the Americans approached willing to devote some of their time to concrete civil defense activities.

On the other hand, a call for volunteers which would simply assert that "civil defense needs volunteers" would lead to results which cannot be forecasted on the basis of any known data, but the numbers of volunteers can safely be expected to be quite low. For such a generalized appeal assumes far too much of each individual long before he actually would choose to volunteer: each individual would have to find out various details of the program (and that takes time and energy; it also takes knowing about sources of such information, and so on), fit these pieces of information into his life pattern, and make a decision about his desire to participate. The time-energy investments and the necessary time-delays in each step would cut into the compliance action quite heavily. However, a generalized call for volunteers under crises conditions would probably parallel the responses to a personalized call under conditions of "normalcy."

Now the same applies to the former family shelter program. Far too much was demanded of each American family in the way of a search for information, its evaluation, planning, financing, buying and building or contracting to have built, and so on. We suggest that the program was less than a great success not because of the opposition of Americans to shelters, but because it did not call for a "simple" but rather exceptionally "complex" form of compliance.

Whether some of these forecasts or interpretations are valid or not remains, in part, to be seen. But they are, at least, subject to validation. We have accepted the risk of being wrong and sought to impute the "meaning" of some of the data from years of research. This reflects our view that we already know a great deal about the nation facing the potential of thermonuclear disaster.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The American public is the actual user of civil defense systems. In part, it plays the role of a passive client. The public may avail itself of the opportunity to utilize emergency systems designed and developed on its behalf and for its benefit. In this regard, the actual effectiveness of civil defense systems under conditions of nuclear warfare, or under other disaster circumstances, depends on public cooperation of the kind which gets built, explicitly or by implication, into the operational systems to begin with.

In part, the public is also an active agent, in that specific participation of at least certain segments of the population is prerequisite for the development of emergency systems, for the maintenance of their continued readiness and for their functioning in environments for which the systems had been set up. Some Americans, and possibly quite a few of them, must perform in emergency-related and specialized roles and must perform these roles adequately.

In this sense then, civil defense, and other emergency systems, have to be designed and implemented in the face of public sentiments and actions. Public sentiments and actions become initially a constraint on the design process, and then, on the estimates of actual effectiveness of the measures under conditions of extreme duress. Thus, it is important to know about public views and feelings, and since they may be subject to change over time, it is equally important to continue knowing about public dispositions.

Simply stated, this is so because favorable dispositions facilitate compliance; they make it easier to implement and maintain whatever systems become adopted as aspects of national, state and local policy; they enhance the willingness of the relevant segments of the public to partake in the necessary technical and organizational activities connected with the systems in their various phases.

The American public is also a crucial body politic. At election time, the public exercises a significant degree of control over the personal and ideational characteristics of those who must shape national and state as well as local policy. Sentiments and feelings about a vast variety of issues enter into the decision calculus of the voter, and it seems obviously important to know the extent to which civil defense measures are such political issues, how important an issue they might be and with which other national problems they are ideologically intertwined.

Apart from elections, our society functions through a complex fabric of interlocking pressure groups of various kinds. Formally organized or not, such groupings take stands on problems of policy which they consider important. Through their actions, they seek to influence both the policy makers directly and the larger body politic so that the policy makers become affected indirectly as well. Pressure groups often arise with respect to particular issues and problems. Public dispositions, both in their direction and intensity, are important among the determinants of whether organized pressures against particular programs are likely; or whether such pressures in support of particular programs are probable; whether such pressures, in whatever direction, are likely to meet with success in fostering or blocking programs or at least in becoming the rallying points for expanding numbers of Americans. Expressions of opinion and attitude are, of course, not votes. But, it seems rather obvious that there must exist a political preference for embracing popular causes whenever possible over adopting less popular or even unpopular stands. This presupposes some knowledge of public thinking, whether this knowledge is acquired by intuition or by collection and analysis of empirical information.

Occasionally, the nation's policy makers must, and do, adopt and implement unpopular programs. This is so because the deeper meaning of the business of government is not merely to be the mirror of public wishes but also to lead. Nonetheless, it is quite essential to know the sources of opposition, both as to their societal composition and as to the reasons which may underlie the public views.

Occasionally, the nation's policy makers must not, or cannot, adopt and implement popular programs. Under such circumstances, the public expects, and has a right to expect, an explanation so that it may comprehend the rationale for which the particular programs ought not be accepted at all, or not accepted for some time, or not accepted in given forms.

Why should it be worthwhile to know what the public thinks about this or that issue of policy? The foregoing are some of the main reasons; the state of public sentiment is much like a river bed which can facilitate as well as impede the flow of national life as it becomes expressed in policy decisions. In addition, since various views of the nation are not insensitive to events and to time itself, it is quite vital to continue assessing the prevailing climate of opinion.

This is the broader context in which our findings concerning the nation's dispositions toward civil defense systems must be understood and interpreted.

Data alone rarely "speak for themselves." After all, in results of national survey inquiries, data are generally percentages or some averages with respect to scales which the researcher, wisely or mistakenly but always somewhat arbitrarily, imposes upon the "real" patterns of human thought. Data as such hold within establishable margins of statistical error, and in this regard they tell a story of their own.

Nonetheless, it is invariably the hunches and intuitions grounded in knowledge and information which provide the most salient context for interpretation of data, indeed for the never-ending "search for meaning." This "search for meaning" concerns the identification of the underlying pattern of insight which data yield, and it has to do with an evaluation of the basic themes which characterize the wide spectrum of bits and pieces of information as components of a prevailing climate of society.

In looking at the results of the 1966 national study--involving a sample of 1,497 Americans interviewed in February and March, 1966--we have the option of scrutinizing the bits and pieces of the national mosaic of thoughts on peace and war, on disarmament and Civil Defense, on Vietnam. We cannot, in a deep sense, be wrong in reporting that some definable part of our populace believes thus and so. We cannot be mistaken in noticing that some changes take place when we compare particular pieces of information with corresponding data from 1964 or 1963 or some other year. Alternatively, we have the option of accepting the risk of being profoundly mistaken, yet, attempt to impute "meaning" which transcends any single piece of information.

Perhaps to harvest some benefits from both of these basic options, without necessarily avoiding all the pitfalls, we have chosen both lines of attack. In this report, section III deals with the international context and section IV deals with civil defense. In sections III A. and IV A. we shall look at the fundamental patterns, the meaning, of all the information at our disposal and accept the risk of erroneous interpretation. This risk, however, we consider tolerably small. Some things we are rather sure we "know" to be so. Some we only "sense" to be the most probable explanation of the behavior of the data. Some of the things we now only "sense," subsequent systematic analysis may vitiate, and others it may support. In III B. and IV B. we will include the data, in the form of tabular presentations, to which our discussions of the fundamental patterns and meaning refer. The C. portions of both sections are based on succinct evaluations of specific items of information. Each has its place in an analysis as much as it has its place in the instrument which has been employed among our interviewees.

II. NATIONAL SURVEY OF 1966

1. Sample

In the national survey just completed, the sampling design called for interviews with 1,500 Americans. The individual respondents were selected at the household level on a quota basis. The fundamental sampling design is one for a national block sample. Actually, 1,497 interviews were conducted on behalf of the University of Pittsburgh by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. In the 1964 national probability sample 1,464 respondents were interviewed whereas in the 1963 nation-wide survey, the study ended with 1,434 probabilistically selected Americans.

Preliminary examples of the comparable samples (1964 and 1966) are provided:

<u>The Sample</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1964</u>
Male	48.3%	44.8%
Female	51.7	55.2
White	85.3	86.1
Negro	14.2	13.3
Other	.5	.7
Single-family dwelling (detached)	67.4	68.6
Single-family dwelling (attached)	6.3	6.5
Two-dwelling house (detached)	3.1	2.9
Two-dwelling house (attached)	7.2	6.9
Multiple dwelling	13.4	13.6
Rooming house	.1	.3
Single, never married	7.1	7.4
Married	80.0	75.9
Divorced	2.5	3.8
Widowed	7.7	10.4
Separated	2.7	2.5
No schooling	0.3	1.3
Grammar school	24.0	25.3
Some high school	22.3	20.3
High school	29.8	29.6
Incomplete college	12.4	13.2
College	6.8	6.0
Higher than college	4.4	4.3

<u>The Sample (Cont'd.)</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1964</u>
Own home	62.2%	64.5%
Rent	34.9	32.9
Upper class (identification)	1.9	3.8
Middle class	44.3	43.4
Working class	47.2	47.8
Lower class	2.7	2.9
There are no classes	2.1	2.1
Standard metropolitan area (2,000,000 or more)	22.6	24.3
Other metropolitan area	40.9	39.1
Non-metropolitan county with major city of 10,000 or more	16.4	15.3
Non-metropolitan county with no city of 10,000	20.7	21.3

2. Study Timing

The 1966 interviews were begun in mid-February, 1966 and terminated by the end of the first week of March. The 1964 and 1963 national surveys were conducted in the summer months (June-early August) of the respective years.

III. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

A. Patterns and Meaning

Perhaps, it is best to begin by saying that the international environment of 1966 is seen as a very tense one. Americans are somewhat optimistic about relaxation of tensions over a five-year span but not with respect to the next couple of years (Tables III-1, III-3). And it seems crucial to point out that World War III, undesirable though it remains, is becoming less unacceptable as a way for ending the Cold War. Indeed, in the 1966 environment almost 15 percent of Americans think it a rather desirable option (Table III-8).

Are we then, as a nation, actually becoming somewhat more war-like? The answer is, in fact, both yes and no. In our data there is a sense of increasing polarization within our society--a growing, though far from crystallized and consummated, cleavage between positions "much softer" than our current stance and positions substantially "harder" than present policy appears to be.

More than that: the kind of major war which is becoming less unwanted than it had been in the past, is a different conflict from that envisaged by Americans in 1964 or in 1963--or in prior years. There are important increases in numbers of people--while such numbers in the overall context remain very small--who feel that a major war would be fought by conventional means altogether, thus without the employment of nuclear weapons. There are exceptionally significant increases in numbers of Americans who feel that nuclear weapons would not be used, at least, at first in such a major conflict and that they might come to be used depending on how the war would go (Table III-25).

An accidental outbreak of a central war is seen less likely in 1966 than in 1963; and there is a highly significant decline in numbers of Americans who believe that a major war might start by a sudden Soviet attack upon the United States. Indeed, such an attack on the part of China is more expected than the parallel mode of triggering off the conflict on the part of the Soviets (Table III-38). Nor is it unimportant to note that the percentage of Americans who think that our own country is least likely to start a major war has declined sharply between 1963 and 1966, with a compensating increment in those respondents who feel that the least probable way in which a war might come involves an "accident" (Table III-39).

There are some inescapable conclusions which we are led to: It is a major conflict with China rather than the Soviet Union to

which people are becoming attuned. It is an engagement with China that seems less unacceptable than the images of a thermo-nuclear holocaust engulfing our nation and the Soviet Union. The sense of the data is strong in suggesting that China has become, in much of the nation's thinking, the primary enemy and that it has all but displaced the Soviet Union from the associated imagery. True enough, there remain significant worries and concerns about the Soviets.

About as many Americans worry about the possibility of a nuclear attack upon the United States in 1966 as in prior studies (Table IV-46). The nation's estimates of the targetting priorities in a nuclear engagement remain essentially unaltered. Military installations are seen as highest priority targets from the vantage point of an enemy, whereas attacks to maximize population destruction are considered as having the lowest priority (Tables III-40 through III-43).

There remains, of course, an important rejection of all possible cold war outcomes in which the Communists, qua Communists, might accede to world predominance (Tables III-6, III-7, III-13). But there is strong focus on China and a major referent of our people as an antagonist has become China (Table III-26).

China, indeed, is seen as desiring the continuation of the arms race. The Russians are not believed to want to maintain the arms race by even half the number of Americans who have the same opinion about China (Tables III-27, III-28, III-29, III-30, III-31). China is seen as eager to invade Vietnam, particularly (and what would seem more natural in this regard?) if it had a chance of succeeding, specifically by forcing U. S. withdrawal. More than ten percent of our respondents expect such an invasion, although by far most of them--as is, too, thoroughly understandable--feel that it would be repelled by our own effort. Furthermore, just about 12 percent of our people think that the conflict in Vietnam will escalate into a major war. In the light of the basic perspectives on the properties of such a war, the escalation involves China and not the Soviet Union. Hence, there is an expectation on the part of more than one in five of our interviewees regarding major escalation of the Vietnamese conflict (Table III-32).

Now, it is important to suggest that the projected characteristics of World War III are such as to lead to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is basically expected to stay out of Sino-American violence. And, while China is seen as maintaining the desirability of the arms race, the Soviets are considered by many of our people as wanting the disarmament of "nations other than the Soviet Union and the United States" (Table III-28).

Indeed, there is an important shift in the temporal dimension of the Cold War and its future courses: Our people are coming to believe that some resolution is nearer than they thought a few years ago (Table I.I-37). They also feel that a major war, should it occur, would come in fairly short order (Table III-33). These are among the central indicators to suggest again that the major emphasis is placed upon the course of events in South East Asia, and that the cataclysm, if at all likely, centers around the behavior of China.

In a significant manner, we must impute to the data a deep and greatly growing sense of American frustration with the state of the world. And we must impute to the data a profound desire to somehow come to grips with the world problems and to do so fairly quickly. It is as if the state of affairs in Vietnam were forcing a more rapid resolution of the major issues which divide the globe and which separate our nation from our potential enemies. We get the feeling: If a major war involved China only and might be confined to conventional weaponry or only eventually escalate into limited deployment of nuclear weapons, it is this above all that accounts for the lowered unacceptability of the conflict. Still, we cannot overstress the fact that such a war remains unwanted.

There are further reasons for asserting that the Vietnamese conflict accentuates both the sense of tensions and the level of national frustrations. There does not seem to be any outcome, at least not among the ones we have posited, which might be simultaneously desirable to the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union. Hence, our people clearly view the crisis as a dilemma, the resolution of which is exceptionally difficult in almost any direction. The strongest expectation is that of a protracted war of somewhat indefinite duration--and this is an outcome or state of affairs as a consequence of the apparent impossibility of alternatives rather than because anyone particularly desires it (Table III-32).

On the other hand, there is some perceived common interest between North Vietnam, South Vietnam and the United States: Only very few Americans believe that these nations would find any mode of Chinese intervention (even a successful one) very acceptable, or that escalation of the limited war into a major war is desirable (Table III-32). Indeed, the latter option is not believed to be wanted even by China and the Soviet Union so that the common interest of all the major parties in the conflict is one of avoiding such escalation. The most wanted solution would lead to unification and neutralization of all of Vietnam: Our respondents do not think that this is very desirable to the Chinese or even to the Russians.

It seems highly salient to point out that just about 84 percent of our respondents would prefer the conflict to terminate through negotiations leading to neutralization of either all of unified Vietnam or to neutralization of South Vietnam. Our national policy in Vietnam is not seen as an effort to be victorious; nor is a Viet Cong defeat or a defeat of Viet Cong through a defeat of North Vietnam considered likely. Thus, the support which the President's policy in Vietnam continues enjoying seems grounded more in both expectations and desires toward a negotiated settlement than in either an anticipation of or even desire for outright victory.

The centrality of the Vietnamese conflict in the nation's thinking is further underscored by the fact that problems of nuclear war in general seem to have been the subject of discussions between the respondents and others in only about one in four instances in the two weeks prior to our study, whereas the war in Vietnam was apparently debated by 70 percent of the respondents in the same time period (Tables III-44 and III-45). This, of course, also suggests that the conflict in Vietnam is considered generally apart from issues which directly bear on problems of thermonuclear warfare, thus further reinforcing the data indication that the South East Asian engagement is not expected to escalate.

In any event, the data suggest that Vietnam is, in some ways, a key to the explanation of 1966 sentiments on the part of the public, or at least of many of them. At the same time, we must not overstate the importance of the Vietnamese engagement. Americans attach fairly high odds to the occurrence of other limited wars in the near future so that even a solution in Vietnam might simply amount to a shift in the arena of battle (Table III-34). There is, however, a different way of looking at the fairly high probability of other limited wars and of intranational conflicts that might pit U. S. troops against guerilla forces or against Communist troops. Possibly, the reality of Vietnam is making similar wars more feasible--since it can happen in Vietnam, it can happen easily elsewhere. If this interpretation were to hold, then subsidiation of the fighting in Vietnam and some relative termination of the war would also have the effect of decreasing the estimated likelihood of other parallel conflicts. We think this, in fact, to be the case. This means that we think that the objective possibilities of limited warfare might, at any given point in time, be different from the perceptions on the part of our people in that the perceptions may be unduly affected by the characteristics of the then-current world environment.

Our people fervently desire disarmament measures to end the Cold War. As before, they prefer global disarmament enforceable

and enforced by a newly established United Nations police force (Table III-30). This is, of course, too much to hope for and the respondents are not optimistic that the near future will lead to the fulfillment of this desire. But they do assign a fair probability that a peacekeeping force might come to be established by the United Nations in the coming five year span, and this, too, they view highly desirable (Tables III-35, III-36). The data thus indicate some willingness to yield a portion of national sovereignty in exchange for greater world security, and consequently, for greater national security. The likelihood that disarmament might end the Cold War at some point has increased somewhat as an average sentiment of Americans by 1966 (Table III-21). Also, more people in 1966 than in 1964, and in turn 1963, believe that the arms race will continue for some time to come (Table III-31).

How do we account for this apparent inconsistency? Indeed, the disarmament likelihood, on balance, has gone up as has the percentage of Americans who think that the most likely future on the arms control-disarmament front is the continuation of the arms race. There are two basic explanations apart from one which postulates built-in instrument inconsistency.

On one hand, it might well be that respondents who think disarmament is likely as a termination of the Cold war, place the Cold War ending into a more distant future and thus also can believe that the arms race will go on for some time to come. This interpretation is directly validatable upon further analysis of the data.

On the other hand, the results might reflect again an increment in national polarization on Cold War issues: in that more Americans believe that the arms race will go on, that the international environment is not particularly conducive to peaceful settlement, that further escalation of the Vietnamese conflict might make disarmament measures nigh impossible and that the high likelihood of further limited wars also does not point in the direction of disarmament steps. At the same time, more Americans--but, of course, a rather different group--believe that disarmament is more likely so that both data effects become manifest in the results. The basic thrust of the data would seem to suggest that the latter explanation is more to the point. When we consider the response patterns related to Vietnam, to small wars, to the Cold War futures themselves, we are led to conclude, if very tentatively, that one of the major consequences of the Vietnamese escalation has been an increasing cleavage in our body politic, a cleavage indeed of those who might exercise considerable pressures toward "softer" and those who might pressure toward "harder" policies in the threatening world.

As of 1966 and at the level of the nation-wide public, the cleavage may be more potential than real. But its beginnings seem visible, so that the amalgamated, and rather typically American, middle position vis-a-vis foreign policy might give to more sharply drawn ideological distinctions with the "center" increasingly pushed into one or the other "camp."

It is, we think, too soon to say that this is what will happen. Further analysis of the current data may permit a stronger (or weaker) conclusion. In part, the conclusion depends very much on identifying whether these alternative dispositions to the international environment correlate with other characteristics of our people so that identifiable segments of the population are more prone to one or another world view. The greater such correlations, the greater the built-in cleavage potential simply because of the variety of other, domestic and foreign, issues which also might be embraced as part and parcel of similar dispositions. What we are saying is much more than that we already have our "doves" and our "hawks." For they are fundamentally specifiable minorities and rather small ones at that. We are pointing to the possible development of such basic sentiments on the part of the larger body politic with all the destabilizing implications which sharply drawn ideological positions have for any given society.

This means, above all, that the state of the international environment in 1966 is much more divisive domestically than were the conditions, frustrating and dissatisfying though they had been in previous years. If this is accurate and barring salutary changes in the world situation--particularly with respect to Vietnam--we would expect these issues to loom very large as major factors in the 1966 national elections because these issues, and Vietnam most concretely, will invariably become also crucial themes of the forthcoming political campaign.* This, in turn, may help to accentuate the cleavage potential even if no further detrimental changes occur in the world situation.

* This was based on data acquired early in the year and initially reported in April. It is worth noting that the election campaigns and the results of the elections appear to have substantiated this expectation.

B. Tabular Presentation of Data

In the tables that follow, all percentages are calculated on the basis of "live" response categories. Thus, minor fluctuations in sample size are attributable to variations in the "don't know," "no answer" response categories.

The dates given are the approximate times the interviews were actually administered.

Table III-1

What number would you say best represents the level of world tension just about now?

	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0 No Tension	0.3	0.8	0.3
1	0.1	0.5	0.2
2	0.8	0.9	0.3
3	2.4	2.7	1.3
4	4.8	6.7	2.4
5	16.4	16.6	11.6
6	13.9	13.2	11.9
7	21.3	16.5	19.5
8	19.0	17.8	19.1
9	8.8	8.5	8.2
10 High Tension	12.1	15.8	25.2
\bar{X}	6.95	6.92	7.59
N	1430	1452	1490
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-2

Which number on the card best represents the world tensions that you personally expect by about--that is--just about two years from now?

	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0 No Tension	0.5	0.7	0.3
1	0.6	0.7	0.7
2	1.7	3.1	1.7
3	4.2	4.6	3.3
4	6.6	7.3	4.3
5	12.5	13.6	11.1
6	10.9	9.3	9.4
7	14.9	14.8	14.7
8	20.0	17.8	18.0
9	13.1	11.5	12.8
10 High Tension	15.1	16.7	23.7
\bar{X}	7.03	6.90	7.42
N	1418	1434	1454
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-3

How about five years from now--which number stands best for the level of tensions in the world which you think might exist then?

	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0 No Tension	0.9	1.7	1.4
1	1.1	1.5	1.6
2	4.4	4.1	4.9
3	7.1	7.6	7.5
4	8.0	10.0	8.1
5	15.1	17.8	17.6
6	11.4	11.2	11.4
7	11.8	11.4	10.2
8	14.8	12.9	12.0
9	10.9	8.4	8.2
10 High Tension	14.6	13.5	17.1
\bar{X}	6.51	6.22	6.35
N	1381	1390	1377
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-4

And which number represents best your opinion as to
world tensions just about two years ago?

	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0 No Tension	0.6	1.0	0.5
1	0.6	1.7	2.1
2	3.0	3.5	4.8
3	6.1	5.7	8.8
4	8.4	8.3	13.8
5	14.5	12.9	20.9
6	13.9	11.8	15.4
7	13.9	13.5	13.0
8	19.4	17.8	11.3
9	11.2	11.2	4.4
10 High Tension	8.3	12.5	5.1
\bar{X}	6.51	6.57	5.61
N	1421	1440	1481
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-5

Desirability - The Cold War will continue indefinitely;
no end is in sight at all

Desirability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly Undesirable	67.8	71.2	75.3
(-2)	11.5	8.7	6.7
(-1)	5.8	4.4	4.0
(0)	3.3	3.4	3.4
(+1)	2.6	2.4	2.0
(+2)	2.6	1.8	0.9
(+3) Highly Desirable	6.4	8.0	7.6
\bar{X}	-2.05	-2.15	-2.17
N	1409	1431	1491
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-6

Desirability - The whole world will become communistic
by people accepting communism.

Desirability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly Undesirable	88.5	89.0	86.8
(-2)	5.5	4.2	4.4
(-1)	1.6	1.7	1.9
(0)	0.8	0.8	2.9
(+1)	0.6	0.6	0.4
(+2)	0.5	0.5	0.3
(+3) Highly Desirable	2.5	3.1	3.3
\bar{X}	-2.69	-2.66	-2.60
N	1413	1433	1490
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-7

Desirability - By revolutions, civil wars and small wars, the Communists will come to power in the whole world.

Desirability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly Undesirable	88.0	88.0	87.6
(-2)	5.6	4.1	3.3
(-1)	1.3	1.3	1.8
(0)	1.1	1.5	1.9
(+1)	0.4	0.4	0.9
(+2)	0.8	0.8	0.4
(+3) Highly Desirable	2.8	3.9	4.0
\bar{X}	-2.66	-2.60	-2.58
N	1414	1432	1488
Study:	Pgh - -T1	Pgh - -T3	Pgh - -T4

Table III-8

Desirability - World War III will end the Cold War.

Desirability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly Undesirable	85.1	71.4	69.7
(-2)	6.2	5.8	4.4
(-1)	1.8	3.5	3.2
(0)	2.0	2.4	3.0
(+1)	1.1	3.0	2.4
(+2)	0.5	2.0	2.4
(+3) Highly Desirable	3.3	12.0	14.9
-			
X	-2.57	-1.86	-1.69
N	1413	1432	1489
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-9

Desirability - The Communists are going to lose due to revolutions, civil wars and small wars in Communist nations.

Desirability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly Undesirable	9.7	10.0	9.1
(-2)	3.0	2.3	3.1
(-1)	1.7	2.4	2.4
(0)	4.7	6.1	6.5
(+1)	5.2	7.5	8.1
(+2)	9.1	10.0	9.3
(+3) Highly Desirable	66.6	61.6	61.5
\bar{X}	+1.87	+1.75	+1.75
N	1413	1433	1487
Study.	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-10

Desirability - The Communists will accept the Western way of life, and the Communist powers will become like the United States, Great Britain or Sweden.

Desirability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly Undesirable	6.7	8.8	9.3
(-2)	2.1	1.4	1.7
(-1)	1.7	2.1	2.2
(0)	5.6	6.5	6.7
(+1)	5.1	6.5	6.8
(+2)	10.6	9.4	8.2
(+3) Highly Desirable	68.2	65.3	65.2
\bar{X}	+2.05	+1.90	+1.85
N	1411	1433	1488
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-11

Desirability - The Cold War will end through disarmament
or reconciliation.

Desirability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly Undesirable	6.7	8.2	6.8
(-2)	1.8	1.2	1.9
(-1)	1.5	1.8	1.3
(0)	2.3	3.8	3.7
(+1)	3.7	4.7	4.9
(+2)	8.3	8.7	8.1
(+3) Highly Desirable	75.7	71.6	73.2
\bar{X}	+2.22	+2.08	+2.15
N	1414	1421	1490
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-12

Desirability - A Third Force, such as a powerful group of neutral nations, will emerge in the world able to control the actions of the Communist nations as well as of the United States.

Desirability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly Undesirable	52.5	53.2	43.1
(-2)	9.1	7.1	6.6
(-1)	6.5	6.3	6.4
(0)	8.5	9.8	8.2
(+1)	6.8	4.8	8.5
(+2)	4.3	4.1	6.3
(+3) Highly Desirable	12.4	14.6	20.9
\bar{X}	-1.30	-1.23	-0.65
N	1407	1423	1487
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-13

Desirability - The United States will have to surrender without war because of the development of such new weapons by Communist nations that the U.S. could not possibly win.

Desirability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1960
(-3) Highly Undesirable	88.0	86.0	85.8
(-2)	5.2	4.2	4.0
(-1)	1.0	1.7	1.5
(0)	1.3	0.9	2.4
(+1)	0.5	0.6	1.0
(+2)	0.7	0.6	0.6
(+3) Highly Desirable	3.4	5.1	4.7
\bar{X}	-2.63	-2.54	-2.51
N	1415	1432	1487
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-14

Desirability - The Communist nations will have to surrender without war because of the development of such new weapons by the United States that the Communists could not possibly win.

Desirability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly Undesirable	9.6	12.7	12.3
(-2)	2.8	2.2	3.1
(-1)	3.2	2.3	2.1
(0)	2.5	3.6	4.2
(+1)	6.6	5.1	7.0
(+2)	10.1	9.6	9.9
(+3) Highly Desirable	65.3	64.5	61.4
\bar{X}	+1.85	+1.73	+1.66
N	1414	1433	1490
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-15

Probability - The Cold War will continue indefinitely;
no end is in sight at all.

Probability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0 Zero Probability	7.7	9.7	9.9
1	5.3	4.2	5.8
2	5.6	5.3	4.3
3	6.5	5.0	5.4
4	7.0	7.1	6.6
5	18.7	19.6	19.9
6	8.7	8.0	6.0
7	7.7	7.0	7.3
8	9.7	8.2	8.7
9	7.3	9.7	8.5
10 Maximum Probability	15.8	16.1	17.7
\bar{X}	5.65	5.68	5.66
N	1409	1431	1491
Study :	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-16

Probability - The whole world will become Communistic
by people accepting Communism.

Probability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0 Zero Probability	56.2	55.0	9.9
1	12.4	13.3	13.5
2	8.6	7.8	8.1
3	5.6	4.7	5.6
4	3.9	4.3	4.4
5	5.2	5.3	8.1
6	2.3	2.3	2.1
7	1.3	1.2	2.3
8	1.7	1.3	1.6
9	1.5	2.1	2.2
10 Maximum Probability	1.4	2.6	2.3
\bar{X}	1.52	1.64	1.89
N	1413	1433	1490
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-17

Probability - By revolution, civil wars and small wars, the Communists will come to power in the whole world.

Probability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0 Zero Probability	39.7	40.2	35.3
1	13.0	12.2	14.0
2	12.2	9.5	11.7
3	7.9	8.5	8.3
4	6.4	6.5	5.9
5	8.2	10.5	9.5
6	3.8	3.1	3.8
7	3.1	2.6	3.0
8	2.0	2.7	3.0
9	2.3	2.0	2.3
10 Maximum Probability	1.3	2.6	3.1
\bar{X}	2.22	2.34	2.53
N	1414	1432	1488
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-18

Probability - World War III will end the Cold War.

Probability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0 Zero Probability	16.3	22.2	18.5
1	7.4	7.2	8.2
2	9.4	7.4	8.6
3	7.0	6.2	6.4
4	6.6	7.1	6.8
5	18.5	18.3	20.0
6	6.6	5.2	6.1
7	4.4	5.6	5.9
8	4.9	5.2	5.6
9	7.4	5.1	4.5
10 Maximum Probability	11.4	10.5	9.7
\bar{X}	4.56	4.23	4.32
N	1413	1432	1489
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-19

Probability - The Communists are going to lose due to revolutions, civil wars and small wars in Communist nations.

Probability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0 Zero Probability	8.3	8.4	9.5
1	4.8	4.7	5.5
2	7.6	7.1	9.4
3	6.9	7.5	8.6
4	10.1	8.2	8.7
5	20.0	21.6	20.8
6	10.1	8.9	9.4
7	9.3	7.9	6.7
8	6.9	8.2	6.9
9	6.3	6.6	5.6
10 Maximum Probability	9.7	10.8	8.0
\bar{X}	5.16	5.24	4.87
N	1413	1433	1487
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-20

Probability - The Communists will accept the Western way of life, and the Communist powers will become like the United States, Great Britain or Sweden.

Probability		July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0	Zero Probability	29.6	27.8	26.2
1		10.6	9.2	9.0
2		8.2	9.5	9.2
3		8.2	7.0	6.7
4		6.9	7.8	7.9
5		14.5	13.7	15.2
6		6.1	6.1	7.1
7		5.5	5.2	4.5
8		3.1	4.9	4.3
9		3.1	3.5	4.4
10	Maximum Probability	4.3	5.1	5.5
\bar{X}		3.22	3.44	3.58
N		1411	1433	1488
Study:		Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-21

Probability - The Cold War will end through disarmament or reconciliation.

Probability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0 Zero Probability	10.5	14.1	12
1	4.0	4.9	5.7
2	6.1	6.3	6.2
3	7.4	7.0	6.1
4	8.4	8.7	6.8
5	19.6	20.0	19.2
6	10.4	7.7	8.9
7	8.1	9.5	8.7
8	8.0	7.7	8.7
9	7.1	5.8	7.7
10 Maximum Probability	9.0	9.6	9.9
\bar{X}	5.12	4.89	5.12
N	1415	1421	1490
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-22

Probability - A Third Force, such as a powerful group of neutral nations, will emerge in the world able to control the actions of the Communist nations as well as of the United States.

Probability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0 Zero Probability	29.4	28.9	18.8
1	10.8	11.2	10.0
2	10.0	7.9	10.4
3	6.9	7.0	7.2
4	7.4	7.3	8.5
5	14.1	14.3	17.1
6	7.2	5.5	6.8
7	3.8	6.3	5.5
8	3.6	4.7	5.1
9	3.2	2.6	4.3
10 Maximum Probability	3.7	4.3	6.3
\bar{X}	3.15	3.30	3.94
N	1407	1423	1487
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-23

Probability - The United States will have to surrender without war because of the development of such new weapons by Communist nations that the U. S. could not possibly win.

Probability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0 Zero Probability	54.0	53.6	50.5
1	13.9	13.7	13.6
2	9.2	8.7	8.5
3	5.2	4.3	6.1
4	3.7	2.6	4.8
5	5.9	7.3	5.9
6	1.6	1.8	2.1
7	1.3	1.5	1.9
8	1.9	1.8	1.6
9	1.6	2.0	2.4
10 Maximum Probability	1.8	2.8	2.7
\bar{X}	1.58	1.73	1.85
N	1415	1432	1487
Study:	Fgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-24

Probability - The Communist nations will have to surrender without war because of the development of such new weapons by the United States that the Communists could not possibly win.

Probability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
0 Zero Probability	21.4	20.8	21.2
1	11.1	7.8	10.0
2	8.6	7.9	9.8
3	8.2	7.6	5.5
4	8.5	7.1	8.9
5	15.3	14.0	14.8
6	6.6	6.4	6.2
7	4.9	5.9	5.3
8	5.1	7.0	4.8
9	4.7	5.1	5.3
10 Maximum Probability	5.4	10.5	7.2
\bar{X}	3.75	4.31	3.91
N	1414	1433	1490
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-25

Which do you think is the most likely way a World War would be fought if it should come?

	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
All nuclear weapons used at once	23.4	23.7	14.5
Nuclear weapons, many used but with reserves	24.7	24.1	16.4
Nuclear weapons, few used at first, more later	18.5	18.0	16.2
Nuclear weapons, none used at first	28.2	27.1	42.7
Conventional war	3.6	5.1	9.2
Other	0.7	0.8	0.1
No war	0.9	1.2	1.0
N	1413	1424	1473
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table II-26

Which is the most likely way in which a World War
will start, if it should come?

	February 1966
War by accident	7.6
War by small, local wars	35.3
War by worsening international relations	13.7
War by Russia	6.5
War by China	11.6
War by war between Russia and China	14.2
War by the United States	0.9
War by other nations	8.4
War by other circumstances	0.7
Never	1.1
N	1478
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table III-27

Disarmament situation China desires most.

	February 1966
The current armament race to continue	39.9
World-wide disarmament, no control provisions	21.3
World-wide disarmament, U. N. police force control	3.0
Disarmament of nations other than U. S. and Russia	4.9
Nuclear disarmament, no control	20.5
Nuclear disarmament, control	3.9
Major arms reduction	6.5
N	1310
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table III-28

Disarmament situation Russia desires most.

	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
The current armament race to continue	14.1	16.3	15.3
World-wide disarmament, no control provisions	23.6	26.6	18.3
World-wide disarmament, U. N. police force control	2.7	3.6	4.9
Disarmament of nations other than U. S. and Russia	15.3	16.7	22.8
Nuclear disarmament, no control	32.4	25.7	25.7
Nuclear disarmament, control	7.7	5.7	6.1
Major arms reduction	4.2	5.5	6.8
N	1346	1352	1380
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-29

Disarmament situation the United States wants most.

	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
The current armament race to continue	2.4	3.5	2.0
World-wide disarmament, no control provisions	4.7	3.4	6.0
World-wide disarmament, U. N. police force control	44.8	49.0	42.6
Disarmament of nations other than U. S. and Russia	2.1	2.4	4.3
Nuclear disarmament, no control	2.4	1.8	3.3
Nuclear disarmament, control	36.7	50.8	28.8
Major arms reduction	6.8	9.2	13.0
N	1388	1402	1440
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T2	Pgh--T4

Table III-30

Disarmament situation you desire most.

	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
The current armament race to continue	2.5	3.6	2.8
World-wide disarmament, no control provisions	5.8	5.3	7.0
World-wide disarmament, U. N. police force control	50.3	53.7	50.0
Disarmament of nations other than U. S. and Russia	1.7	2.3	2.3
Nuclear disarmament, no control	2.6	1.1	3.2
Nuclear disarmament, control	27.9	25.2	22.6
Major arms reduction	9.4	8.8	12.1
N	1385	1407	1457
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-31

Disarmament situation you expect most in the next five years.

	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
The current armament race to continue	36.1	40.1	43.4
World-wide disarmament, no control provisions	2.6	3.0	3.1
World-wide disarmament, U. N. police force control	8.4	13.8	7.0
Disarmament of nations other than U. S. and Russia	4.0	2.6	5.4
Nuclear disarmament, no control	14.1	3.0	14.8
Nuclear disarmament, control	28.7	17.1	18.3
Major arms reduction	6.1	20.4	7.9
N	1370	1388	1437
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-32

Possible Vietnam Outcomes:
Their likelihood, desirability, and attributed desirability

VARIABLES:	The war in Vietnam will continue for a very long time with no real ending.	The Viet Cong in South Vietnam will be defeated.	The Viet Cong will win in South Vietnam and take over the country.	North Vietnam will take over all of Vietnam.	North Vietnam will be defeated.	The Chinese will invade South Vietnam, as they did in Korea, and will be forced back.	The Chinese will invade South Vietnam and force the United States to leave.	The war in Vietnam will expand into World War III.	Negotiations will end the war in South Vietnam and the country will be neutralized.	Negotiations will end the war in South Vietnam and all Vietnam North and South, will be united and neutral.	N
1. <u>Likely</u> Vietnam ending for you personally.	27.2	8.0	1.1	1.2	3.5	8.0	2.6	11.8	25.8	10.9	1443
2. <u>Desired</u> Vietnam ending for you personally.	0.3	12.4	0.5	0.7	3.8	1.8	0.5	0.6	24.8	54.7	1462
3. <u>Desired</u> Vietnam ending for Russia.	12.7	2.0	22.5	12.7	1.6	7.4	22.1	4.8	6.8	7.2	1373
4. <u>Desired</u> Vietnam ending for China.	5.3	1.6	17.2	9.5	0.6	5.5	54.8	3.3	0.9	1.1	1406
5. <u>Desired</u> Vietnam ending for United States.	0.7	10.5	0.6	0.1	3.7	0.8	0.1	0.2	28.4	55.0	1447
6. <u>Desired</u> Vietnam ending for South Vietnam.	0.7	16.1	6.0	1.1	9.0	0.9	1.0	0.6	30.5	34.1	1369
7. <u>Desired</u> Vietnam ending for North Vietnam.	1.1	4.8	21.9	42.3	1.3	1.3	4.6	0.7	6.9	15.3	1382

Table III-23

If another World War should come, when do you think
it would start?

	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
Within six months	1.5	1.2	4.2
Within 1-2 years	13.1	13.6	27.9
Within 5 years	34.5	31.6	32.2
Within 10 years	24.9	25.9	18.9
Within 20 years	8.7	8.5	6.6
Over 20 years	5.2	8.9	2.9
Depend	4.8	3.6	2.0
Will never happen	7.3	6.7	5.2
N	1377	1345	1399
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-34

In the next few years, say about 1970, how likely do you think it is that there will be limited wars which involve Communist and U. S. troops--wars similar to that in Vietnam.

Likelihood	February 1966
0 Zero Likelihood	4.1
1	0.9
2	1.8
3	2.4
3	2.4
5	47.8
6	4.2
7	6.8
8	9.8
9	5.4
10 Maximum Likelihood	14.4
\bar{X}	6.05
N	1430
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table III-35
Probability of possible international situations by 1970

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	N	\bar{X}
Many more countries than presently have them will have their own nuclear weapons and this will increase world tensions.	4.9	2.6	3.3	3.3	4.3	19.5	10.1	10.4	11.0	11.2	19.4	1485	6.50
The United States and the Soviet Union will agree to treaties banning all nuclear tests.	13.6	7.4	8.1	7.8	8.4	21.9	8.0	5.1	6.5	5.2	7.9	1486	4.52
The United Nations will have a permanent armed peacekeeping force made up of troops from all member nations to enforce its peacekeeping decisions.	6.5	5.1	6.9	5.9	8.6	23.4	8.0	8.2	7.4	8.4	11.4	1485	5.43
The United States will have anti-missile missiles that will be so effective that no enemy would think of attacking us.	10.4	6.8	6.3	5.5	7.0	20.0	8.9	7.5	7.8	7.5	12.1	1484	5.22
The present splits and disagreements among the Communist nations will become greater and they will not present a unified threat to the free world.	9.2	6.1	6.9	6.9	8.5	25.9	10.1	8.0	7.0	5.3	6.1	1483	4.85

Table III-35

Probability of possible international situations by 1970 (Cont'd.)

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	N	\bar{X}
The United States and the Soviet Union will work out many of their disputes and live together in peace.	15.2	7.4	8.5	8.1	7.7	19.5	7.3	6.8	6.2	4.6	8.7	1486	4.47
The United States and the Soviet Union will agree to restrict shipment of arms to other countries.	14.9	9.3	10.4	8.8	9.6	21.6	7.5	5.7	3.6	3.1	5.4	1485	3.99
The United States and the Soviet Union will agree to mutual cuts and reduction in their missiles and nuclear weapons.	12.3	7.9	7.5	9.6	8.7	24.3	7.9	6.5	5.5	3.6	6.3	1485	4.39

Table III-36

Desirability of possible international situations by 1970.

	Desirability								N	\bar{X}
	Highly Undesirable (-3)	(-2)	(-1)	(0)	(+1)	(+2)	Highly Desirable (+3)			
Many more countries than presently have them will have their own nuclear weapons and this will increase world tensions	79.8	4.8	3.6	2.6	2.4	1.4	5.4	1485	-2.31	
The United States and the Soviet Union will agree to treaties banning all nuclear tests	5.7	2.8	2.2	4.2	6.9	10.4	67.8	1486	+2.06	
The United Nations will have a permanent armed peacekeeping force made up of troops from all member nations to enforce its peacekeeping decisions.	5.0	1.4	1.3	5.0	5.5	10.4	71.3	1485	+2.21	
The United States will have anti-missile missiles that will be so effective that no enemy would think of attacking us.	6.9	1.2	1.8	3.8	7.3	9.2	69.7	1484	+2.10	
The present splits and disagreements among the Communist nations will become greater and they will not present a unified threat to the free world.	13.5	2.7	2.8	6.1	6.9	9.9	58.2	1483	+1.53	
The United States and the Soviet Union will work out many of their disputes and live together in peace.	3.8	0.7	0.8	1.5	3.6	7.5	82.0	1486	+2.51	

Table III-26

Desirability of possible international situations by 1970. (Cont'd.)

	Desirability						
	Highly Undesirable (-3)	(-2)	(-1)	(0)	(+1)	(+2)	Highly Desirable (+3)
The United States and the Soviet Union will agree to restrict ship- ment of arms to other countries.	6.7	2.6	2.7	8.9	9.8	11.7	57.6
							1485
The United States and the Soviet Union will agree to mutual cuts and reduction in their missiles and nuclear weapons.	6.7	2.1	2.7	4.9	9.0	13.3	61.3
							1485
							+1.76
							+1.93

Table III-37

The way it looks to you today, when would you say the Cold War will probably end?

	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
Within two years	5.0	7.6	20.8
Within five years	24.7	23.5	27.5
Within ten years	25.2	25.3	14.3
Ten to twenty years	18.4	15.8	13.6
Over twenty to fifty years	5.6	6.6	7.4
Over fifty years	6.2	6.2	3.2
Never	15.0	15.0	13.1
N	1295	1163	1415
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-38

Which is the most likely way in which a World War will start, if it should come.

	July 1963	February 1966
War by accident	12.4	7.6
War by small, local wars	33.2	35.3
War by worsening international relations	15.9	13.7
War by Russia	21.9	6.5
War by China	--	11.6
War by war between Russia and China	--	14.2
War by the United States	0.7	0.9
War by other nations	13.6	8.4
War by other circumstances	1.2	0.7
Never	1.0	1.1
N	1408	1478
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T4

Table III-39

Which is the least likely way in which a World War will start, if it should come.

	July 1963	February 1966
War by accident	27.2	35.5
War by small, local wars	2.9	2.6
War by worsening international relations	3.0	2.1
War by Russia	3.9	5.5
War by China	--	2.7
War by war between Russia and China	--	4.8
War by the United States	53.3	38.1
War by other nations	8.0	7.9
War by other circumstances	0.1	0.0
Never	0.7	0.8
N	1399	1455
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T4

Table III-40

If a major war were to come, an enemy might have different objectives in mind. How important is: destroying our military bases.

	July 1964	February 1966
1 - Most important	59.3	55.9
2	29.1	33.3
3	8.3	8.2
4 - Least important	3.3	2.6
N	1445	1482
Study:	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-41

If a major war were to come, an enemy might have different objectives. How important is: destroying our factories and transportation centers.

	July 1964	February 1966
1 - Most important	29.2	32.4
2	51.5	48.6
3	13.6	13.6
4 - Least important	5.8	5.4
N	1442	1478
Study:	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-42

If a major war were to come, an enemy might have different objectives in mind. How important is: destroying our cities.

	July 1964	February 1966
1 - Most important	5.8	6.1
2	14.2	12.3
3	65.1	64.8
4 - Least important	14.9	16.8
N	1433	1'67
Study:	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-43

If a major war were to come, an enemy might have different objectives in mind. How important is: destroying our people.

	July 1964	February 1966
1 - Most important	5.9	5.7
2	5.4	5.8
3	13.1	13.5
4 - Least important	75.6	75.0
N	1407	1471
Study:	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-44

Have you discussed any aspect of the current Vietnam situation with anyone in the past two weeks?

	February 1966
Yes	70.3
No	29.7
N	1494
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table III-45

In the past two weeks have you discussed a nuclear war and its consequences with anyone?

	February 1966
Yes	25.9
No	74.1
N	1491
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table III-46

How much do you yourself worry about the possibility of
a nuclear attack on the United States?

	January 1963	July 1964	February 1966
Great deal	20.0	15.7	18.2
Some	31.0	28.5	27.6
A little	21.0	25.7	26.9
Not at all	28.0	30.1	27.4
N	1363	1457	1495
Study:	BASR 9 Comm.	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table III-47

How likely do you think it is that there will be wars between other countries in which neither major Communist nor U. S. troops will be involved at first--such as the war between India and Pakistan.

	February 1966
0 Zero Likelihood	7.1
1	2.2
2	5.1
3	5.8
4	4.0
5	36.5
6	5.0
7	8.1
8	10.3
9	4.9
10 Maximum Likelihood	11.1
\bar{X}	5.52
N	1330
Study:	Pgh--T4

C. Evaluation of Specific Items

1. International Tensions

The instrument provides for a zero-to-ten scale with respect to which the respondent is asked to evaluate international tensions at four points in time--about now, in two years, in five years, and two years ago. The zero point is intended to reflect absence of world tensions, whereas the other extreme of the scale, ten, mirrors exceptionally high tension levels.

(a) In 1966, Americans perceive higher international tensions (average 7.59) than they did in 1964 (6.92) or in 1963 (6.95). This seems clearly attributable to the relative escalation of the conflict in South East Asia and its ramifications for our society.

(b) The relatively high average, 7.59, is particularly important since it points, in a way, to disappointed expectations, since in 1964 the respondents expected the tensions of 1966 to be about what they were in 1964 and, in fact, somewhat lower (6.90).

(c) The 1966 sample yields an average of 6.35 in estimating tensions five years hence and a modest decline from 7.59 to 7.42 is anticipated into 1968.

(d) In 1963, the 1968 level of tensions was expected to be about 6.51; in 1966, estimate is, of course, 7.42.

(e) Elsewhere, we have argued in terms of a kind of "revision of history" hypothesis. It postulates that currently tense environments produce a redefinition of the past so that it, in turn, appears better than it actually may have been. Alternatively, the hypothesis goes to say that improvements on the world scene make the past, by contrast, bleaker than it may have been in reality. Since the 1966 environment is viewed fraught with tension, we would expect that the images of 1964 on the part of our 1966 respondents would make 1964 "better" than it really was. This conclusion is fully justified. In 1964, the respondents estimated the then-current tensions at 6.92; the 1966 respondents recall 1964 as substantially less threatening; 5.55.

IMAGES OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS*
(0-10 SCALE NATIONAL AVERAGES)

	1963 Sample (N=1434)	1964 Sample (N=1464)	1966 Sample (N=1497)
1961	6.51		
1962		6.57	
1963	<u>6.95</u>		
1964		<u>6.92</u>	5.61
1965	7.03		
1966		6.90	<u>7.59</u>
1967			
1968	6.51		7.42
1969		6.22	
1970			
1971			6.35

* The tension levels current at the time of the interviews are underlined above. Due to the omission of a nation-wide study in 1965, no estimates are available for 1967 and 1970.

2. Cold War Outcomes: Likelihood

The respondents were given ten small cards each of which identified a possible terminal outcome of the cold war conflict. They were asked to estimate the likelihood of each of these outcomes, the odds that the cold war might end in the manner specified on the respective card. The likelihood estimates employ a zero-to-ten scale. Zero stands for impossible or extremely unlikely futures; ten for certain or almost certain ones; and five is the fifty-fifty likelihood point.

(a) In 1966, Americans still hold the view that the cold war might go on indefinitely. The continuation of the basic state of affairs is assigned higher likelihood than any other

alternative; and this was so in the 1964 and 1963 studies as well. The 1966 status quo likelihood average is 5.66; and it was 5.68 in 1964, and 5.65 in 1963.

(b) Acceptance of Communism by the nations of the world, and thus an ending of the cold war through a process of conversion to the Communist doctrines, is not seen likely. The 1966 average is 1.89; the 1964, 1.64; the 1963 odds were 1.52. Perhaps there is even significance in the gradual increments in this probability, but it might be too early to tell.

(c) Communism's global victory through revolutions, small wars and civil wars also is improbable. But the likelihood goes from 2.22 in 1963, to 2.34 in 1964, and eventually to 2.54 in 1966. There is a moderate increase in the estimate not unlike that which characterizes the peaceful mode of Communism's accession.

(d) The chances of World War III have remained essentially stable between 1963 and 1966 (4.56; 4.23; 4.32 in the three successive surveys). It seems important to say that these estimates are generally lower than those which tended to be obtained in the years prior to 1962.

(e) There is a slight decline in the likelihood that the cold war might end through upheavals in the Communist nations. The 1966 sample average is 4.87; it was 5.24 in 1964, and 5.16 in 1963.

(f) Chances for liberalization of the Communist nations are, however, increasing. Even in 1966, nevertheless, this is not one of the more probable cold war endings. The 1963 average was 3.22; it was 3.44 by 1964; and it is 3.58 in 1966.

(g) Prospects for disarmament and reconciliation are improved compared with 1964 (5.12 in 1966; 4.89 in 1964) and thus reach their 1963 level. Indeed, only the indefinite continuation of the cold war is more probable in the 1966 study than disarmament.

(h) The likelihood that a Third Force might emerge on the world scene is going up. From 3.15 in 1963 to 3.30 in 1964, the average has become 3.94 by 1966.

(i) Neither an American nor a Soviet surrender are expected. The odds of the Soviets having to yield in face of overwhelming odds without fighting, are somewhat higher than the corresponding likelihood of our own surrender under parallel circumstances (3.91 as contrasted with 1.85).

3. Cold War Outcomes: Desirability

A scale with numbered options between plus three and minus three was used again in the effort to ask respondents to evaluate the desirability of each of the possible endings of the cold war.

(a) The continuation of the cold war into the indefinite future remains highly undesirable. The 1966 average is -2.16; it was -2.15 in 1964, and -2.05 in 1963. Yet, this is the most probable future of the cold war conflict.

(b) Communism's acceptance remains highly unwanted.

1966	-2.60
1964	-2.66
1963	-2.69

(c) Communist success in revolutions, civil wars and small wars is similarly highly undesirable.

1966	-2.58
1964	-2.60
1962	-2.66

While there appears to exist some indication of an incipient trend toward lessened unacceptability of Communism, the differences thus far are not significant and lie well within the margin of sampling fluctuations.

(d) World War III remains undesirable, but there is something of a trend toward making it less unwanted than it had been:

1966	-1.69
1964	-1.86
1963	-2.57

Thus a central war remains less undesirable than America's surrender, Communism's victory through localized violence, and Communism's acceptance. It may be said that our respondents are suggesting that a major conflict would be more acceptable if the choice had to be made between large scale warfare and the more unwanted outcomes.

(e) Revolutionary upheavals in Communist societies remain desirable as they were before:

1966	+1.75
1964	+1.75
1963	+1.87

(f) Evolution of democratic governmental forms through liberalizing processes in Communist nations is, of course, also desired:

1966	+1.85
1964	+1.90
1963	+2.05

(g) Disarmament and reconciliation as terminal outcomes of the cold war are still the most wanted option:

1966	+2.15
1964	+2.08
1963	+2.22

(h) There is a decline in undesirability of a Third Force. Its ascendance, however, is still somewhat unwanted:

1966	-0.65
1964	-1.23
1963	-1.30

(i) United States surrender is highly undesirable--more than any other outcome. Soviet surrender is desired but not as much as disarmament, liberalization, or even anti-Communist revolutions.

	U. S. Surrender	Soviet Surrender
1966	-2.51	+1.66
1964	-2.54	+1.73
1963	-2.63	+1.85

4. Cold War Outcomes: Timing

The respondents were asked to identify the approximate time frame within which the cold war might come to the ending which they envisage.

(a) Some 13.1 percent Americans think that the cold war might, in fact, "never" end. This compares with some 17.7 percent of the respondents who assign "certainty" or "near certainty" (scale value TEN) to the indefinite continuation of the status quo. In 1964, as well as in 1963, 15.0 percent of the respondents were similarly convinced that the cold war might go on and thus no time frame can be assigned to its termination.

(b) By 1966 there are many more respondents who think, however, that the cold war (Soviet-American conflict primarily) will end within two years. The differences between the current sample and the past ones are quite important.

Ending within Two Years	
1966	20.8%
1964	7.6
1963	5.0

(c) In 1964, there were some 23.5 percent Americans who estimated the cold war ending within five years. On the premise that many of them may not have changed their mind since 1964, the 1966 figure of 20.8 percent for the two year time perspective might be explainable.

(d) By 1966, the cold war termination is generally expected "sooner" than it had been in either 1964 or in 1963. The medians reflect the difference:

Median Years to Cold War End	
1966	5 1/2
1964	8 1/2

5. Central War

In addition to the items on likelihood and desirability of World War III as a mode of terminating the cold war conflict, various additional probes are built into the instrument to deal with the nuclear war prospects:

- (a) should nuclear war occur at all, when might it be expected
- (b) how would such a war start
- (c) how would it be fought; how would nuclear weapons be used
- (d) which targets would be attacked in the event of a nuclear conflict
- (e) the extent to which people claim to worry about nuclear war in our time.
- (f) the extent to which they discuss such a war with others

These issues refine our understanding of the perceived properties of a large scale violent conflict.

(a) In 1966, a nuclear conflict is expected within a shorter time period--if it should happen at all--than in either 1964 or in 1963.

	Within Six Months	Within Two Years	Within Five Years
1966	4.2%	27.9%	32.2%
1964	1.2	13.6	31.6
1963	1.5	13.1	34.5

(b) That a major war might start by accident is not expected. Few respondents select this as the most probable trigger of a central war, and quite a few consider an accidental outbreak of a major war the least likely option. Furthermore, war by accident is anticipated even less in 1966 than in 1963.

	Way for a War to Start Accidental War	
	Most Likely	Least Likely
1966	7.6%	35.5%
1963	12.4	27.2

(c) Escalation of smaller conflicts into a major war is seen as the most probable way in which a central war would come about.

	Way for a War to Start War by Escalation	
	Most Likely	Least Likely
1966	35.3%	2.9%
1963	33.2	2.6

(d) A sudden planned Russian or Chinese attack upon the United States as the beginning of a major war is seen less likely in 1966 than in 1963.

	Way for a War to Start Sudden Attack	
	Most Likely	Least Likely
1966	18.1%	8.2%
1963	21.9	3.9

(e) A sudden planned Chinese attack is more likely than a Soviet attack: the data on this distinction are available in 1966 only so that no comparison is possible.

Sudden Attack
Most Likely

Soviet	6.5%
Chinese	11.6

(f) Some 14.2 percent of the respondents in the 1966 sample feel that the United States might be drawn into a Soviet-Chinese war.

(g) A planned American attack to precipitate the all out conflict is considered the least likely alternative. But many more Americans consider this the least probable option in 1963 than in 1966.

Sudden U. S. Attack
Least Likely

1966	38.1%
1963	53.3

The difference between 1966 and 1963 may, however, reflect the fact that the 1966 roster of possible beginnings of international violence includes a sudden Chinese attack upon the United States and the United States being drawn into a Chinese-Soviet war as additional options so that the respondents are distributed over two more possibilities.

(h) A spasm war in which "all nuclear weapons would be used just about at once" is less expected in 1966 than before.

1966	14.5%
1964	23.7
1963	23.4

(i) In 1966 many more Americans believe that no nuclear weapons would be used at first than they did in either 1964 or in 1963, but they might be deployed in the course of the war depending on how the conflict went.

1966	42.7%
1964	27.1
1963	28.2

(j) More people in 1966 than before feel that the war might just involve conventional weapons.

1966	0.2%
1964	5.1
1963	3.6

(k) Military installations as such are clearly considered the crucial enemy target.

	Most Important	Next Most Important
1966	55.9%	33.3%
1964	59.3	29.1

(l) The nation's industries are singled out consistently as the second target system of highest priority.

	Most Important	Next Most Important
1966	32.4%	48.6%
1964	29.2	51.5

(m) Population centered attacks remain the least important relative to the target complexes suggested in our instrument (military installations* factories and transportation centers; cities; populations).

	Least Important	Next Least Important
1966	75.0%	13.5%
1964	75.6	13.1

(n) Americans worry about the possibility of a nuclear attack on the United States as they did in 1964 and in 1963; about 55 percent worry either a little or not at all, whereas the remaining ones worry either a great deal or some.

	Worry	Do Not Worry
1966	45.8%	54.2%
1964	44.2	55.8
1963*	51.0	49.0

(o) About one in four Americans claim to have discussed wars and the probability of wars with each other in the recent past.

* The comparable 1963 data for this item are drawn from a national study of the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University. No similar item was, on the other hand, included in the Pittsburgh 1963 study.

Some 25.9 percent of the respondents claim such discussions within two weeks prior to the 1966 interviews.

6. Limited Wars

Using another zero-to-ten point scale, the respondents were asked about the likelihood, by 1970, of limited wars which might involve Communist and United States troops--wars similar to that in Vietnam. They were also asked about the countries which might be affected in this manner. The interviewees were similarly asked about the likelihood of wars in which neither major Communist nor United States troops would be involved--such as the war between India and Pakistan. The data on countries which might be the battleground of the Vietnamese variety, or which might engage in wars with one another, are not available as of this writing.

(a) The code of conflicts not unlike the Vietnamese one yield an average likelihood of 6.04 in the 1966 sample.

(b) Some 14.4 percent of the respondents think that such limited conflicts are certain or nearly certain within the time frame of this decade; only some 4.1 percent believe that such wars are either impossible or nearly impossible.

(c) Of the total sample (N=1497), 78.7 percent respondents named countries in which such future conflict might occur.

(d) Wars among other nations have a 1966 likelihood of 5.52 on the average. Thus Americans also think that there are some real possibilities that wars of the India-Pakistan variety might occur within the next few years

(e) Some 11.1 percent of the respondents believe such conflicts to be extremely probable; 7.1 percent view them as extremely unlikely.

(f) Some 53.9 percent of all respondents named some nations which might become involved in wars during the next several years.

7. Vietnam

To establish the nation's perspectives on the Vietnamese conflict in its present form, the respondents were provided with statements of ten alternative endings of the war. They were asked to single out (a) the mos. likely termination of the Vietnamese conflict, (b) the most desirable ending, (c) the ending most wanted by the Soviets, (d) the ending most desired by China, (e) the ending most desired by the United States, (f) the ending most desired

by the South Vietnamese, and (g) the ending most wanted by the North Vietnamese.

(a) Indefinite continuation of the Vietnamese conflict is expected by many Americans, but it is not seen desirable to anyone--but perhaps to the Russians more than to any of the other groups about which the respondents were questioned.

Protracted Conflict

Expected	27.2%
Desired by Soviets	12.7
China	5.3
North Vietnam	1.1
South Vietnam	0.7
United States	0.7
Respondent	0.3

(b) Defeat of the Viet Cong in the South is the third most wanted option both from the respondent's vantage point, from the vantage point of the United States, and also by South Vietnam. Not many Americans, however, expect the war to end in this manner.

Viet Cong Defeat

Expected	8.0%
Desired by Soviets	2.0
China	1.6
North Vietnam	4.8
South Vietnam	16.1
United States	10.5
Respondents	12.4

(c) Of course, Viet Cong victory is seen wanted by the North Vietnamese, the Russians and the Chinese. It is the second preferred option for the North Vietnamese and the Chinese, and the most desired outcome by the Russians.

Viet Cong Victory

Expected	1.1%
Desired by Soviets	22.5
China	17.2
North Vietnam	21.9
South Vietnam	6.0
United States	0.6
Respondents	0.5

(d) North Vietnam's success throughout Vietnam upon intervention on an appropriate scale, is by far the option seen most desired by North Vietnam. But its desirability to Russia, as well as China, is not exceptionally high. The victory of North Vietnam is also unlikely.

North Vietnam Victory

Expected	1.2%
Desired by Soviets	12.7
China	9.5
North Vietnam	42.3
South Vietnam	1.1
United States	0.1
Respondents	0.7

(e) Predicated on greater involvement of North Vietnam in the conflict, the defeat of North Vietnam as a termination of the war is not probable, nor is it seen desirable to any of the groups considered.

North Vietnam Defeat

Expected	3.5%
Desired by Soviets	1.6
China	0.6
North Vietnam	1.3
South Vietnam	9.0
United States	3.7
Respondents	3.8

(f) A Chinese invasion in which the aggressors might be pushed back, as in Korea, is similarly not expected very much and it is not a desirable state of affairs from the vantage point of the referent groups.

Repulsion of China Upon Invasion

Expected	8.0%
Desired by Soviets	7.4
China	5.5
North Vietnam	1.3
South Vietnam	0.9
United States	0.8
Respondents	1.8

(g) A Chinese invasion as a consequence of which the United States might be forced to leave Vietnam is seen as by far the most desired option from the standpoint of China. The respondents feel that the Russians would not mind this either. But they do not think that the North Vietnamese favor this. In any event, the possibility is not expected by many Americans at this time.

China Victory Upon
Invasion

Expected	2.6%
Desired by Soviets	22.1
China	54.8
North Vietnam	4.6
South Vietnam	1.0
United States	0.1
Respondents	0.5

(h) That the conflict in South Vietnam might escalate into a major war is seen as the third most likely termination of the war although only some 12 percent Americans select this alternative. The option is seen not desirable to any of the referent groups, including China and the Soviet Union.

Escalation into World
War III

Expected	11.8%
Desired by Soviets	4.8
China	3.3
North Vietnam	0.7
South Vietnam	0.6
United States	0.2
Respondents	0.6

(i) The ending of the conflict through negotiations whereby South Vietnam might become neutralized is considered quite likely, and also desirable to the United States and South Vietnam. But it is not viewed as particularly acceptable to the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam.

Negotiations and Neutralization of South Vietnam

Expected	25.8%
Desired by Soviets	6.8
China	0.9
North Vietnam	6.9
South Vietnam	30.5
United States	28.4
Respondents	24.8

(j) Finally, the termination of the war through negotiations whereby all of Vietnam is unified and neutralized is somewhat likely; but it is the most desired future on the part of the respondents themselves, the United States. And it is seen basically acceptable to the South Vietnamese as well as to the North Vietnamese.

Negotiations and Unification and Neutralization of all of Vietnam

Expected	10.9%
Desired by Soviets	7.2
China	1.1
North Vietnam	15.3
South Vietnam	34.1
United States	55.0
Respondents	54.7

(k) About 26 percent of the respondents claimed to have been involved in discussions about the possibilities of a major war in the two weeks preceding the interview. However, in the same time period, 70.3 percent participated in discussions of the conflict in Vietnam.

8. Disarmament

In terms of the likelihood and desirability of various endings of the cold war conflict, we know that disarmament and reconciliation are viewed as the most wanted alternatives in 1966 as was, indeed, the case in prior studies. The likelihood of disarmament has increased from 1963 to 1966, although it remains oscillating around the fifty-fifty scale point.

In addition to these items, we provided the respondents with a list of seven forms which disarmament might take (including the possibility of a continued arms race). The interviewees were

again asked to identify (a) the most likely disarmament future, (b) the one which they personally desire most, (c) the one they believe the United States seeks most, (d) the one they think the Soviets want most, and (e) the one they believe China desires most. Data on China's desirability with regard to disarmament are not available from our previous surveys.

(a) If anything, the continuation of the arms race is seen as most likely, and the likelihood is somewhat increasing over the years. The outcome is also wanted by China, and it has some perceived acceptability to the Russians.

Arms Race Continued			
	1966	1964	1963
Expected	43.4%	40.1%	36.1%
Desired by Soviets	15.3	16.3	14.7
China	39.9	--no data--	
United States	2.0	3.5	2.4
Respondents	2.3	3.6	2.5

(b) Global disarmament without provisions for inspection and control remains wanted by the Russians (in 1966, this is the third most desired future on the arms control-disarmament spectrum), and it is acceptable to China. But it is also unlikely and unacceptable to the United States and to the respondents personally.

Global Disarmament Without Controls			
	1966	1964	1963
Expected	3.1%	3.0%	2.6%
Desired by Soviets	18.3	26.6	23.6
China	21.3	--no data--	
United States	6.0	3.4	4.7
Respondents	7.0	5.3	5.8

(c) World-wide disarmament which might be policed by the United Nations is still the most wanted alternative, but not a likely one. Its desirability to Russia and China is low as well.

Global Disarmament with
U. N. Police Force

	1966	1964	1963
Expected	7.0%	13.8%	8.4%
Desired by Soviets	4.9	3.6	2.7
China	3.0	--no data--	
United States	42.6	49.0	44.8
Respondents	50.0	53.7	50.3

(d) Disarmament of nations other than the United States and the Soviets is seen unlikely and generally unwanted. But in 1966, the Soviets are believed to find this quite an acceptable option, clearly reflecting America's images of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations.

Disarmament of Nations Other
than the U.S.S.R. and U.S.

	1966	1964	1963
Expected	5.4%	2.6%	4.0%
Desired by Soviets	22.8	16.7	15.3
China	4.9	--no data--	
United States	4.3	2.4	2.1
Respondents	2.3	2.3	1.7

(e) Nuclear disarmament without control provisions is seen as having some likelihood, and it is believed wanted to a significant degree by both Russia and China.

Nuclear Disarmament without
Controls

	1966	1964	1963
Expected	14.8%	3.0%	14.1%
Desired by Soviets	25.7	25.7	32.4
China	20.5	--no data--	
United States	3.3	1.8	2.4
Respondents	3.2	1.1	2.6

(f) Only the continuation of the arms race is selected by (many) more Americans as the most likely option than is nuclear disarmament with control and inspection provisions. But the alternative is not seen as desirable to the United States as might be global

armament with appropriate controls, and it is also not as desired by the respondents themselves. Neither the Russians nor the Chinese are believed to view this possibility as most wanted by substantial numbers of our citizens.

Nuclear Disarmament with Controls

	1966	1964	1963
Expected	18.3%	17.1%	28.7%
Desired by Soviets	6.1	5.7	7.7
China	3.9	--no data--	
United States	28.8	30.8	36.7
Respondents	22.6	25.2	27.8

(g) Major arms reduction reflecting variable military power at the outset is not anticipated, nor is it believed very desirable to any of the referent groups.

Major Arms Reduction

	1966	1964	1963
Expected	7.9%	20.4%	6.1%
Desired by Soviets	6.8	5.5	4.2
China	6.5	--no data--	
United States	13.0	9.2	6.8
Respondents	12.1	8.8	9.4

9. Other Cold War Transformations

Apart from terminal outcomes of the cold war, some of the more concrete dimensions of prospective limited warfare, the outcomes of the on-going struggle in Vietnam, the possibilities on the arms control and disarmament front, we sought to probe into several realistic shifts in the state of the international environment. The likelihood and desirability of each of eight options was measured, using again zero-to-ten scales for the likelihood assessments, and plus three to minus three scales in connection with desirability.

(a) In 1966, Americans do expect further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the next five years, and they consider this option highly undesirable.

Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons

Likelihood	6.50
Desirability	-2.31

(b) That the Soviet Union and the United States might "work out many of their disputes and live together in peace" has a likelihood lower than fifty-fifty, but a very high desirability.

Reconciliation

Likelihood	4.47
Desirability	+2.51

(c) The establishment of a United Nations armed peace-keeping force is somewhat more probable than not, and the option has a high positive desirability. We know already that global disarmament policed by such a peace-keeping force of the United Nations is extremely desired, although it is not one of the likely changes on the arms control and disarmament spectrum.

Establishment of U. N. Peacekeeping Force

Likelihood	5.43
Desirability	+2.21

(d) The development of anti-missile missiles on the part of the United States so that "no enemy would think of attacking us" is somewhat likely in the next five years. The prospects loom attractive to our respondents.

U.S. Anti-Missile Defenses as a Deterrent Force

Likelihood	5.22
Desirability	+2.10

(e) Further specific steps towards arms control are generally seen less likely, even though they are quite desirable to the 1966 interviewees.

	Treaty Banning All Nuclear Tests	Restriction on Shipment of Arms to Other Countries	Reduction in Missiles and Nuclear Weapons
Likelihood	4.52	3.99	4.39
Desirability	+2.06	+1.78	+1.93

(f) Americans think that further widening of the splits among Communist nations is nearly as likely as not. It is desirable.

Further Splits Among Communist Powers

Likelihood	4.85
Desirability	+1.53

IV. CIVIL DEFENSE

A. Patterns and Meanings

Even though we sense the domestic polarization potential with respect to foreign policy issues, and particularly those which bear on the conflict in Vietnam, it remains equally clear that sentiments and actions concerning Civil Defense are not an aspect of the same sets of orientations. Americans remain rather undivided in their highly favorable dispositions toward measures of Civil Defense (Table IV-22).

This level of favorableness does not seem to apply differentially to alternative programs for the protection of civilians. Thus, the patterns of responses are quite similar whether we are engaged in an effort at blast shelter programs, or in strategic evacuation concepts, in marking and stocking activities, in the coupling of anti-missile missiles with population sheltering. This is quite important, indeed, because it indicates that Americans are not prepared to take sharply different stands on the basis of the specific characteristics of a Civil Defense program. Rather, we surmise that this suggests that they imply that some kind of an effort is necessary, that they are unwilling to tell the Government what kinds of programs it ought to have, and that such decisions really need to be made by those men in policy making positions who have information on which to base their eventual choices. The actual opposition to the various measures remains at most at around ten percent, whereas the patterns of support are actually increased in the 1966 environment over the already high support levels of 1964 and 1963 (Tables IV-1 through IV-9).

We know, of course, that by far more Americans advocate a firm stand in Vietnam than favor other options. We know also, that Civil Defense systems are considered by our people in the national defense context. This is clear when we recognize that two in three respondents believe that a protected nation would be more difficult to blackmail (Table IV-36), and that more than nine in ten Americans do not feel that there is no need for civil defense systems because of the adequacy of already existing defenses (Table IV-37), and that we would not do better in spending funds which might be allocated to measures of civil defense on further strengthening of our strategic force (Table IV-40). In this climate of sentiment, it is obviously not surprising that positive assessments of Civil Defense did not waver from 1963 to 1966, but were somewhat enhanced, if anything.

The Berlin Wall crisis and the Cuban missile confrontation were good examples of acute international situations. They generated a

greater sense of urgency in the defense field as a whole, and with regard to Civil Defense, at least for the duration of each crisis and in its immediate aftermath. The conflict in Vietnam seems to have been defined by our people more as a chronic than an acute crisis so that the data do not reveal a sense of a potentially impending central war. Thus, the Vietnamese war could not lead to devaluation of Civil Defense because most Americans support a strong position in Vietnam, and it does not lead to urgent demands for Civil Defense systems because the conflict is a more chronic than an acute one.

"Protection of civilians" is not considered one of the two major national problems. Only seven percent of the respondents single it out as such in the context of problems of "world poverty," "spread of World Communism," "high taxes," "race relations," and so on (Table IV-10). It is, of course, not surprising: how many people could one expect to identify civil defense measures as one of two most pressing problems which face the nation? Yet, Civil Defense fares much better as a national program deserving an appropriate portion of national resources in face of other programs (Table IV-11). Only programs of aid to higher education and efforts on the national health front are rated higher in importance as needing adequate federal funding. Now what "adequate" funding means, the data do not reveal. From prior research, we know, however, that Americans advocate annual expenditures of the magnitude which exceeds even the most ambitious Civil Defense systems thus far ever propounded. Even so, "adequate" funding for Civil Defense, realistically, falls below the kinds of resources which are required in conjunction with most other major national programs.

The nation's public does not need to be sold on Civil Defense. It has fully accepted it, and what might be required most is actual further action programs rather than programs to convince people of the virtues of an effort which they already consider highly worthwhile. Some six in ten Americans claim that they would volunteer for Civil Defense activities if a call for volunteers were issued (Table IV-40). This cannot be construed to mean, however, that actually 60 percent of our people would, in fact, offer their services in response to a general appeal. Many factors enter such situations, including the knowledge about a call for volunteers, the ease with which the act of volunteering can be accomplished, the specificity of activities and their apparent reasonableness, and so on. Nonetheless, the data suggest that we should expect up to six in ten Americans to actually respond to a personalized call for Civil Defense help, and if the Americans who claim to be undecided are taken into account, up to seven in ten might do so.

We have already asserted that measures of Civil Defense seem to be viewed by our people as an aspect of the nation's broader defense

effort. There exists, in fact, a general and lasting disposition in our public to positive evaluations of all dimensions of national defense, clearly related to a sense of pride in the country's past, current and future might. This apparent cognitive coupling of Civil Defense with the larger defense picture of the nation accounts, in some measure, for the consistently positive assessment of Civil Defense. At the same time, Civil Defense systems are also seen as effective in their own right, at least when we consider the pivotal problem of shelters. As in prior years, Americans are convinced that survival odds would be greatly enhanced for a sheltered population (Tables IV-23 through IV-26), and as many as nine in ten subscribe to the view that Civil Defense programs could save many lives in the event of a nuclear attack upon the nation (Table IV-33) even though quite a few of our citizens feel that little in genuine defense against hazards of thermonuclear warfare can be accomplished (Table IV-41). But even this position characterizes at most one in five respondents, while other Americans are convinced in the nation's ability to defend itself effectively even in a nuclear holocaust.

Furthermore, some 95 percent of the respondents also see a significant and positive role for Civil Defense in face of natural disasters and other emergencies (Table IV-38) so that there is considerable indication in the data that the nation is acquiring a not negligible capability for defense against nuclear weapons and, at the same time, an important mechanism for coping with other emergencies. These favorable images of Civil Defense effectiveness thus further contribute to the prevailing climate of opinion.

We must not neglect the fact that by far most of our citizens do not lend credence to arguments about negative domestic and international impacts of Civil Defense activities. Clearly, they favor fallout shelters (Table IV-27) even though almost one in three respondents think that the shelters may make people worry more about the possibility of war (Table IV-28). But they personally worry less about this implication than they believe other Americans might be concerned (Table IV-29). Eight in ten do not feel that fallout shelter programs jeopardize the chances of disarmament, and an additional seven percent actually believe that the disarmament prospects might be enhanced rather than negatively affected (Table IV-30). Only eight percent of the respondents feel that shelter programs actually increase the odds of war, while the vast majority of our people think that the war probabilities are not affected by such programs one way or another (Table IV-31).

As in the 1963 inquiry, we find that the 1966 respondents attribute high desirability of Civil Defense to various significant national groups. In fact, they are convinced that Civil Defense programs are quite desirable to all the groups about which they were probed (Tables IV-12 through IV-20). There is, therefore, an opinion

climate which not only characterizes most individuals by their own favorableness but also by an imputation of similar favorableness to scientists, military leaders, U.S. Congress, Democrats, Republicans, local mayor, editor of their favorite local newspaper, clergy. The groups, in turn, which are believed to be most pro-Civil Defense, the military leaders, scientists and the United States Congress, are also the groups whose opinion the public agrees to take most into account (Table IV-21). A reinforcement factor is then operating in the situation, a process whereby the lack of perceived opposition or even any rationale for opposition, may further increment the positive dispositions of the respondents.

Now, it might be easy to be under the impression that particular programs, or their components, are at odds with other crucial national values. For instance, the shelter assignment concept as an ingredient of the Community Shelter Planning program currently under way could become a source of difficulty. This could be so since Americans might object to the idea of "being told" what to do, including the notion of being told which specific shelters to use in the event of an attack upon the nation. The 1966 data do not substantiate these concerns. The shelter assignment notion is not objectionable, and programs which imply it are quite as desirable as are some of the other alternatives. There is very little negative feeling associated with the possibility (Table IV-8). Rational considerations having to do with knowing where to go in the event of an attack seem to outweigh any possible negative implications of "being told" what to do and where to go. It may well be, of course, that particular modes of implementation of the program could be conducive to a modicum of resentment in some of the nation's localities. But even this does not seem likely as of now.

Furthermore, the idea of a home shelter survey is also very well received. Indeed, our questionnaire item does not indicate the manner in which such a survey would be conducted. It even leaves it open to speculation that actual visits to homes might be necessary, a way of implementing the program quite different from the Bureau of the Census form as used by now in Rhode Island, Maine and Minnesota (Table IV-7). It is important to note that our nation-wide study reveals that 76 percent of the respondents assign positive desirabilities to the home survey concept, and an additional 11 percent do not view it undesirable, or desirable.

This, in fact, should be interpreted to mean that we would not have any reason to think that responses of Americans to the home survey instrument will fall below about 75 percent anywhere in the nation, and that they can be actually expected in the vicinity of 85 percent on the premise that those Americans who are "indifferent" will more often than not comply with the program. In the way of a ceiling, we do not think the home survey responses will exceed 93

percent, since some seven percent of our people have a distinctly unfavorable view of the effort, and they are generally the same householders who oppose other Civil Defense programs as well.

The current approach to the home surveys provides the respondents with feedback information about their homes for use as family shelters. There is no apparent intention behind the program to wider usage of shelter space found in private homes. Our item in the questionnaire leaves this possibility open by not mentioning it one way or another. The respondents are told only that they would be given information about protective capabilities of their home. But some could easily jump to the conclusion that such home shelters could have a wider neighborhood or community use than merely for their own family (and friends and neighbors of their own choice).

Thus, our data would suggest that even a subsequent effort to use some of the nation's homes as more public shelters on a volunteer basis would meet with considerable willingness to do so on the part of our home owners. We would suspect that at least those Americans who evaluate the home shelter survey concept with the highest admissible desirability of (+3) would cooperate in such a program: some 55 percent of the respondents.

In any event, it seems quite important to assert that both new options--shelter assignment and home shelter survey--are quite desirable and the data suggest that actual implementation does not face difficulties in public acceptance and, indeed, in public compliance.

We cannot, of course, be certain of the validity of this interpretation. The data do not directly bear it out. Nonetheless, our question did not assume that information obtained from Home Shelter Surveys would not become public knowledge, and the respondents were in no way told that whatever home sheltering capabilities identified through the surveys might not be incorporated into the network of nation's protection systems. Hence, our question was substantially "stronger" than the actual conduct of the Home Shelter Surveys. Despite these factors, the responses are overwhelmingly positive and it seems therefore reasonable to argue that at least those respondents who are most positive about the idea would not be altogether reluctant to wider use of their sheltering area.

B. Tabular Presentation of Data

In the tables that follow, all percentages are calculated on the basis of "live" response categories. Thus, minor fluctuations in sample size are attributable to variations in the "don't know", "no answer" response categories.

Some questions include data drawn from the Nine Community Study of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University. In such cases, the question asked was identical to that used in the Pittsburgh studies.

The dates given are the approximate times the interviews were actually administered.

Table IV-1

CD-1 Let's assume that all available spaces which provide good protection against fallout will be marked as shelters and stocked with everything necessary for survival. How desirable would that be as far as you're concerned?

Desirability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly Undesirable	2.6	4.9	2.1
(-2)	1.5	1.3	.7
(-1)	1.3	.9	.7
(0)	4.6	3.9	6.0
(+1)	8.5	5.3	6.1
(+2)	12.5	9.5	7.9
(+3) Highly Desirable	69.0	74.1	76.5
-			
X	+2.28	+2.29	+2.43
N	1416	1431	1486
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table IV-2

CD-2 Let's assume there will be fallout shelters available for all Americans. Existing spaces will be used, other spaces will be altered to provide protection, and as needed, new fallout shelters will be built. How desirable would that be?

Desirability	July 1963*	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly Undesirable	7.4	5.0	2.2
(-2)	2.8	2.0	1.2
(-1)	3.5	1.5	2.0
(0)	9.1	5.0	8.2
(+1)	11.3	7.5	7.3
(+2)	14.4	11.3	12.3
(+3) Highly Desirable	51.6	67.9	66.9
\bar{X}	+1.64	+2.13	+2.22
N	1413	1431	1480
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--14

* Note to Pgh--T1: Fallout shelters for everyone, provided for with Federal Aid.

Table IV-3

CD-3 Suppose, in tense situations which might precede a war, communities near military bases--plus some large cities--would evacuate their people to safer areas where fallout shelters would be available. Tell me how desirable that would be for you personally.

Desirability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly Undesirable	5.7	6.7	5.6
(-2)	2.1	1.6	2.8
(-1)	2.5	1.5	2.9
(0)	7.4	4.5	14.9
(+1)	11.2	7.1	9.1
(+2)	15.2	13.1	14.3
(+3) Highly Desirable	55.9	65.5	50.4
\bar{X}	+1.86	+2.05	+1.64
N	1414	1430	1459
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table IV-4

CD-4 There would be fallout shelters throughout the nation, and also shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chemical and biological agents in large cities. How desirable would that be for you?

Desirability	July 1963	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly Undesirable	5.5	4.9	3.4
(-2)	2.1	2.7	.9
(-1)	2.6	1.3	1.5
(0)	10.7	4.2	9.3
(+1)	12.4	6.9	8.9
(+2)	13.6	12.3	12.2
(+3) Highly Desirable	52.9	67.7	63.8
\bar{X}	+1.75	+2.13	+2.11
N	1414	1430	1468
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table IV-5

CD-5 Suppose, in addition to shelters and existing defense against bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic missiles around our large cities and military installations. How desirable would that be?

Desirability	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly undesirable	4.9	2.4
(-2)	2.1	1.4
(-1)	.7	1.4
(0)	3.9	6.8
(+1)	6.4	7.4
(+2)	13.3	12.7
(+3) Highly desirable	68.6	68.0
\bar{X}	+2.19	+2.26
N	1425	1470
Study:	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table IV-6

CD-6 Let's assume there would be a program for the Federal Government to pay part of the cost of putting fallout shelters in buildings constructed by nonprofit organizations, such as hospitals and schools. How desirable do you feel that would be?

Desirability	July 1963*	July 1964	February 1966
(-3) Highly undesirable	2.5	5.2	3.2
(-2)	.9	2.6	1.2
(-1)	1.3	1.7	2.0
(0)	3.3	5.8	7.0
(+1)	4.9	7.2	8.7
(+2)	9.2	12.7	13.3
(+3) Highly desirable	77.8	64.9	64.7
\bar{X}	+2.46	+2.05	+2.15
N	1416	1430	1477
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

*NOTE: Pgh--T1--Schools throughout U. S. will have fallout shelters. (No mention of Federal aid or fallout shelters in other non-profit organizations.)

Table IV-7

CD-7 Suppose all private homes with basements would be surveyed as possible fallout shelters and the owners informed if their home qualifies as a shelter. How desirable would that be?

Desirability	February 1966
(-3) Highly undesirable	7.3
(-2)	2.7
(-1)	2.9
(0)	11.1
(+1)	8.6
(+2)	12.2
(+3) Highly desirable	55.2
\bar{X}	+1.68
N	1471
Study:	Pgh- -T4

Table IV-8

CD-8 Suppose every American, individuals and families, would be provided a definite fallout shelter space convenient to their home and work. How desirable would that be?

Desirability	February 1966
(-3) Highly undesirable	3.5
(-2)	1.7
(-1)	1.8
(0)	7.0
(+1)	7.2
(+2)	11.3
(+3) Highly desirable	67.5
\bar{X}	+2.17
N	1479
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-9

CD-9 Suppose there would be no Civil Defense program
and existing shelters would fall into disuse.
How desirable would that be?

Desirability	February 1966
(-3) Highly undesirable	67.9
(-2)	8.4
(-1)	8.1
(0)	9.2
(+1)	2.0
(+2)	1.4
(+3) Highly desirable	3.1
\bar{X}	-2.15
N	1473
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-10

MAJOR PROBLEMS FACING THE UNITED STATES TODAY:
MOST IMPORTANT, NEXT MOST IMPORTANT, LEAST IMPORTANT

	World Poverty	Spread of World Communism	Avoiding Nuclear War	High Taxes	Race Relations	Communism in the United States	Crime in the Streets	Protection of Our Citizens in Case of Nuclear Attack	Juvenile Delinquency	N
Most Important Problem Facing United States	10.5	25.5	24.8	5.0	14.5	9.6	4.0	1.5	4.5	1487
Second Most Important Problem Facing United States	14.4	15.9	14.2	5.4	18.3	10.5	7.6	5.5	8.3	1482
Least Important Problem Facing United States	11.7	4.1	4.8	32.1	9.4	6.5	7.3	14.0	9.4	1410

Table IV-11

IMPORTANCE TO PROVIDE "ADEQUATE" FUNDING FOR VARIOUS NATIONAL PROGRAMS COMPETING BEFORE CONGRESS

	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Somewhat Unimportant	Very Unimportant	N
Civil Defense Programs	56.5	33.0	7.5	3.1	1470
National Health Programs	65.2	30.1	3.6	1.1	1480
Aid to Developing Nations	17.2	49.1	22.9	10.8	1457
Space Exploration Programs	24.8	36.8	21.6	16.8	1456
Undersea Exploration Programs	17.4	38.1	28.2	16.3	1426
Mass Public Transportation Programs - not including highways	28.2	40.3	21.9	9.6	1440
A Program of Aid to Higher Education	68.6	25.3	4.1	2.0	1483
War on Poverty Program	48.7	31.7	11.6	8.0	1465

Table IV-12

How do you imagine Democrats feel about Civil Defense?

Favorability	July 1963	February 1966
(-3) Highly unfavorable	.7	1.2
(-2)	0.8	0.5
(-1)	1.5	0.7
(0)	8.8	11.7
(+1)	15.6	9.9
(+2)	25.8	15.8
(+3) Highly favorable	46.7	60.2
\bar{X}	+2.02	+2.17
N	1355	1345
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T4

Table IV-13

How do you imagine Republicans feel about Civil Defense?

Favorability	July 1963	February 1966
(-3) Highly unfavorable	1.4	1.8
(-2)	1.2	1.1
(-1)	3.8	1.9
(0)	11.6	12.9
(+1)	19.5	12.6
(+2)	24.5	15.9
(+3) Highly favorable	38.0	53.8
\bar{X}	+1.72	+1.96
N	1346	1338
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T4

Table IV-14

How do you imagine the U. S. Congress feels about
Civil Defense?

Favorability	July 1963	February 1966
(-3) Highly unfavorable	1.0	0.9
(-2)	.9	0.2
(-1)	1.5	0.9
(0)	8.6	11.1
(+1)	15.7	12.6
(+2)	22.3	16.0
(+3) Highly favorable	50.0	58.2
\bar{X}	+2.04	+2.15
N	1386	1397
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T4

Table IV-15

How do you imagine Businessmen feel about Civil Defense?

Favorability	February 1966
(-3) Highly unfavorable	1.1
(-2)	1.0
(-1)	2.7
(0)	19.9
(+1)	16.0
(+2)	14.1
(+3) Highly favorable	45.1
\bar{X}	+1.71
N	1399
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-16

How do you imagine Military leaders feel about
Civil Defense?

Desirability	February 1966
(-3) Highly unfavorable	0.5
(-2)	0.8
(-1)	0.8
(0)	4.8
(+1)	6.2
(+2)	11.3
(+3) Highly favorable	75.7
\bar{X}	+2.52
N	1426
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-17

How do you imagine Scientists feel about Civil Defense?

Favorability	February 1966
(-3) Highly unfavorable	1.7
(-2)	1.3
(-1)	0.9
(0)	10.1
(+1)	7.4
(+2)	11.5
(+3) Highly favorable	67.1
\bar{X}	+2.23
N	1388
Study:	Pgn--T4

Table IV-18

How do you imagine the Mayor of your city feels about Civil Defense?

Favorability	July 1963	February 1966
(-3) Highly unfavorable	.5	1.4
(-2)	.9	0.8
(-1)	1.2	0.8
(0)	9.6	12.7
(+1)	15.9	12.1
(+2)	22.2	12.3
(+3) Highly favorable	49.7	59.9
\bar{X}	+2.05	+2.10
N	1289	1313
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T4

Table IV-19

How do you imagine the Editor of your favorite local newspaper feels about Civil Defense?

Favorability	July 1963	February 1966
(-3) Highly unfavorable	.8	1.3
(-2)	.8	0.7
(-1)	1.7	1.1
(0)	9.2	13.0
(+1)	17.0	11.5
(+2)	24.9	15.9
(+3) Highly favorable	45.7	56.5
\bar{X}	+1.98	+2.06
N	1288	1290
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T4

Table IV-20

How do you imagine the local clergymen feel about Civil Defense?

Favorability	July 1963	February 1966
(-3) Highly Unfavorable	.6	1.4
(-2)	.8	1.1
(-1)	2.1	0.6
(0)	8.7	12.6
(+1)	15.8	10.1
(+2)	21.9	12.5
(+3) Highly Favorable	50.2	61.7
\bar{X}	+2.05	+2.13
N	1313	1306
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T4

Table IV-21

Of those on this list, which one's opinion about Civil Defense programs and fallout shelters counts most of all with you?

	February 1966
Democrats	5.6
Republicans	1.8
U.S. Congress	21.8
Businessmen	1.3
Military leaders	33.4
Scientists	20.1
Mayor	7.7
Editor of favorite paper	2.3
Local Clergyman	6.0
N	1411
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-22

How do you yourself feel about Civil Defense?

Favorability	February 1966
(-3) Highly Unfavorable	2.2
(-2)	0.5
(-1)	1.1
(0)	9.5
(+1)	7.5
(+2)	10.8
(+3) Highly Favorable	68.3
\bar{X}	+2.25
N	1477
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-23

In case of nuclear war, how great a danger do you think there is that the area around here would be a target-- certain danger, great danger, some danger, little danger or no danger at all?

	January 1963	July 1964	February 1966
Certain danger	14.4	21.6	21.0
Great danger	31.9	32.2	31.4
Some danger	23.7	26.9	26.2
Little danger	15.5	13.7	16.3
No danger	14.4	4.3	4.4
Everywhere would be hit	--	0.8	0.5
Never happen	--	0.6	0.3
N	1341	1447	1489
Study:	BASR 9 CORM.	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table IV-24

If a nuclear war started next week, how good are the chances that people around here would survive--very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?

	January 1963	July 1964	February 1966
Very good	2.2	4.7	5.2
Fairly good	22.8	21.2	24.8
50-50 chance	10.9	11.3	13.0
Fairly bad	20.6	21.0	22.9
Very bad	36.9	34.7	29.9
No chance	6.5	6.9	4.3
Never will happen	--	0.2	0.0
N	1265	1431	1474
Study:	BASR 9 Comm.	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table IV-25

If a nuclear war occurred and this area itself was not destroyed, how great a danger do you think there would be from fallout around here--very great, fairly great, or little or no danger?

	January 1963	July 1964	February 1966
Very great danger	54.4	34.5	38.7
Fairly great danger	34.4	45.5	41.6
Little danger	11.1	18.4	18.2
No danger	--	1.5	1.4
Will never happen	--	0.1	0.0
N	1239	1403	1453
Study:	BASR 9 Comm.	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

NOTE: In the BASR 9 Comm. study, "Little danger" and "No danger" were combined into one category.

Table IV-26

How good would the chances be then that people in this area would survive if they were in fallout shelters--very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?

	January 1963	July 1964	February 1966
Very good	18.5	18.4	22.5
Fairly good	39.1	47.4	46.9
50-50 chance	13.0	13.6	14.1
Fairly bad	15.2	10.6	8.1
Very bad	11.9	8.0	6.7
No chance at all	2.2	1.8	1.6
Never will happen	--	0.1	0.0
N	1273	1422	1468
Study:	BASR 9 Comm.	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table IV-27

In general, how do you yourself feel about public fallout shelters--are you strongly in favor of them, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed or strongly opposed to them?

	February 1966
Strongly favor	48.5
Somewhat favor	38.2
Somewhat opposed	9.0
Strongly opposed	4.4
N	1463
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-28

In your opinion, do fallout shelters make people worry more or worry less about the possibility of war, or doesn't it make any difference?

	July 1964	February 1966
More	37.1	29.3
Less	20.1	24.1
No difference	42.8	46.6
N	1426	1464
Study:	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table IV-29

Do fallout shelters make you worry more or worry less about the possibility of war or doesn't it make any difference?

	February 1966
More	13.1
Less	18.3
No difference	68.6
N	1488
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-30

In your opinion, do fallout shelters make it more difficult or less difficult to get disarmament, or don't they make any difference?

	July 1964	February 1966
More difficult	11.5	9.3
Less difficult	8.5	6.6
No difference	80.0	84.2
N	1369	1435
Study:	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table IV-31

In your opinion, do fallout shelters make war more likely or less likely, or don't they make any difference?

	July 1 st 1	February 1966
More likely	9.0	7.6
Less likely	12.4	7.1
No difference	78.6	85.3
N	1418	1473
Study:	Pgh--T3	Pgh--T4

Table IV-32

An American Civil Defense program would make the Russians think we are preparing for war.

	February 1966
Strongly agree	7.6
Agree	29.6
Disagree	50.9
Strongly disagree	12.0
N	1441
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-33

A Civil Defense program could save many American lives
if a nuclear attack took place.

	February 1966
Strongly agree	52.1
Agree	41.3
Disagree	5.0
Strongly disagree	1.6
N	1470
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-34

An adequate Civil Defense program would be too expensive.

	February 1966
Strongly agree	11.9
Agree	27.0
Disagree	46.9
Strongly disagree	14.2
N	1405
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-35

There is no need for Civil Defense because nuclear war is impossible.

	February 1966
Strongly agree	1.1
Agree	3.7
Disagree	46.1
Strongly disagree	49.2
N	1452
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-36

A Civil Defense program protecting our population would indicate to a potential enemy that we couldn't be pushed around in a showdown.

	February 1966
Strongly agree	19.6
Agree	48.0
Disagree	25.4
Strongly disagree	7.0
N	1431
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-37

There is no need for Civil Defense because our present bombers, missiles, and other military defenses are adequate.

	February 1966
Strongly agree	1.5
Agree	7.6
Disagree	56.8
Strongly disagree	34.1
N	1433
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-38

In addition to providing protection in event of a nuclear attack, a Civil Defense program could also be very useful in coping with natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes.

	February 1966
Strongly agree	42.6
Agree	51.8
Disagree	4.2
Strongly disagree	1.4
N	1462
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-39

An American Civil Defense program would be viewed as selfish and aggressive by neutral nations.

	February 1966
Strongly agree	1.7
Agree	16.8
Disagree	62.1
Strongly disagree	19.4
N	1377
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-40

Money that might be spent on Civil Defense would be better invested in more bombers and missiles.

	February 1966
Strongly agree	1.9
Agree	12.8
Disagree	62.8
Strongly disagree	22.5
N	1394
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-41

There is no defense possible in the event of nuclear war.

	February 1966
Strongly agree	6.6
Agree	14.2
Disagree	57.4
Strongly disagree	21.8
N	1399
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-42

Has the current American involvement in Vietnam made you more concerned about an improved Civil Defense program for your community?

	February 1966
More concerned	38.9
Less concerned	2.2
No difference	58.9
N	1491
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-43

How has your attitude about Civil Defense changed as a result of the Cuban crisis?

	July 1963
Much more favorable	7.5
More favorable	27.1
Remained the same	63.3
More unfavorable	1.8
Much more unfavorable	0.3
N	1419
Study:	Pgh--T1

Table IV-44

If a call went out for volunteers to participate in a community Civil Defense program, would you personally be likely to volunteer?

	February 1966
Definitely yes	23.5
Probably yes	38.9
Undecided	9.0
Probably not	20.5
Definitely not	8.1
N	1496
Study:	Pgh--T4

Table IV-45

Do you and your family have a private (family) fallout shelter at your place of residence?

	July 1963	February 1966
Yes	2.2	3.5
No	97.8	96.5
N	1433	1497
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T4

Table IV-46

If you and your family are protected in any way in case of a nuclear (atomic) attack, how?

	July 1963
In house impromptu	76.0
Community shelter	22.8
Assume there is a community shelter	1.0
General community responsibility	0.0
N	329
Study:	Pgh--T1

Table IV-47

Even though you have not set up a private (family) shelter, have you designated some specific area or place in your home to be used in case of nuclear attack?

	July 1963	February 1966
Yes	24.9	29.7
No	75.1	66.7
Not applicable	--	3.6
N	1351	1470
Study:	Pgh--T1	Pgh--T4

C. Evaluation of Specific Items

1. Civil Defense Programs

The respondents were asked to assess the desirability of nine Civil Defense options. A scale ranging from plus three to minus three was used.

(a) The marking and stocking program is assigned the highest average desirability. More than three in four Americans, in fact, used the (+3) desirability option in their evaluation. Now operational, the program fares even better with the public in 1966 than it did in 1964 and 1963.

	<u>Marking and Stocking</u>		
	1966	1964	1963
Desirability	+ 2.43	+ 2.29	+ 2.28
Percent (+3) Response	76.5	74.1	69.0

(b) The marking and stocking program, coupled with efforts to alter other potential spaces to provide protection and to build new fallout shelters as needed, is similarly very acceptable.

	<u>Full Fallout Protection Program</u>		
	1966	1964	1963
Desirability	+ 2.22	+ 2.13	+ 1.64
Percent (+3) Response	66.9	67.9	51.6

(c) A program to evacuate major cities upon strategic warning and to move the inhabitants into areas with sheltering provisions is again desirable, although somewhat less so than in either 1964 or in 1963.

	<u>Strategic Evacuation to Sheltered Areas</u>		
	1966	1964	1963
Desirability	+ 1.64	+ 2.05	+ 1.86
Percent (+3) Response	50.4	65.5	55.9

(d) A full fallout protection program augmented by blast shelter provisions in large cities is desirable. Among the eight active Civil Defense programs about which the respondents were questioned, it ranks sixth in desirability.

Full Fallout Program and Blast
Shelters in Major Cities

	1966	1964	1963
Desirability	+ 2.11	+ 2.13	+ 1.75
Percent (+3) Response	63.8	67.7	52.9

(e) The coupling of Civil Defense protection systems with defenses against ballistic missiles (around the nation's large cities) is second in desirability only to the current, now completed, marking and stocking program.

Civil Defense and Anti-Missile Missiles

	1966	1964	1963
Desirability	+ 2.26	+ 2.19	no data
Percent (+3) Response	68.0	68.6	

(f) A program to include fallout shelters, at Federal cost, into new buildings constructed by non-profit organizations remains desirable.

Fallout Shelters in New Buildings

	1966	1964	1963
Desirability	+ 2.15	+ 2.05	+ 2.46
Percent (+3) Response	64.7	64.9	77.8

(g) The 1966 respondents are quite receptive to the idea of being assigned shelter space convenient to their homes and work. A program to conduct home surveys to determine the area which might provide the best protection and how much protection it might provide, also is desirable although it is the least positively evaluated shelter option.

	<u>Shelter Space Assignment</u>	<u>Home Survey</u>
Desirability	+ 2.17	+ 1.68
Percent (+3) Response	67.5	55.2

(h) The respondents were also asked:

"Suppose there would be no Civil Defense program and existing shelters would fall into disuse."

This possibility has a high negative desirability; more than two in three respondents attached the (-3) scale value to the prospect.

	<u>No Civil Defense</u>
Desirability	- 2.15
Percent (-3) Response	67.9

(i) With regard to all the programs, opposition (people with -3, -2 and -1 responses) is infrequent. Relatively few Americans assign negative values to the potential measures.

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1963</u>
Marking and Stocking Program	3.5%	7.1%	5.4%
Full Fallout Shelter Program	5.4	8.5	13.7
Strategic Evacuation Program	11.3	9.8	10.3
Fallout Program with Blast Shelters in Cities	5.8	8.9	10.2
Shelters and Anti-Missile Missiles in Major Cities	5.2	7.7	no data
Shelters in Newly Constructed Buildings	6.4	9.5	4.7
Shelter Assignment Program	7.0	--no data--	
Home Survey Program	12.9	--no data--	
No Civil Defense Program (+3; +2; +1 Responses)	6.5	--no data--	

2. Civil Defense and Various National Groups

In the way of an overall evaluation, the respondents were asked to assess the desirability of Civil Defense measures, and particularly of fallout shelter programs, to specific national groups. They were also asked to select the group whose opinion on the issue of fallout shelters they consider most important for themselves.

(a) Civil Defense programs are seen very desirable to all the groups about which the respondents were questioned. Military leaders and scientists are seen as particularly favorable.

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1963</u>
Military leaders	+ 2.52	No data
Scientists	+ 2.23	No data
Democrats	+ 2.17	+ 2.02
U. S. Congress	+ 2.15	+ 2.04
Local clergymen	+ 2.13	+ 2.05
Mayor of own town or city	+ 2.10	+ 2.05
Editor of local paper	+ 2.06	+ 1.98
Republicans	+ 1.96	+ 1.72
Businessmen	+ 1.71	No data

(b) Where comparable data exist, the 1966 estimate yields higher desirability of Civil Defense to each of the groups than does the corresponding 1963 average.

(c) Asked about personal desirability of Civil Defense as an aspect of this more general question, the respondents are quite strong in their support. The desirability average is + 2.25 and relative to the desirability attribution to various groups second only to the perception of military leaders.

(d) The views of three of the groups are particularly important to the respondents: the opinions of military leaders, U. S. Congress and of scientists.

Military leaders	33.4%
U. S. Congress	21.8
Scientists	20.1

(e) The groups which are least frequently selected as those whose opinion counts most with the respondents include the businessmen, Republicans, editor of their favorite local newspaper and Democrats.

Businessmen	1.3%
Editor	2.3
Republicans	1.8
Democrats	5.6

(f) The groups whose opinion counts most (military leaders, U.S. Congress and scientists) are also the groups believed to be most favorable to Civil Defense programs.

3. National Importance of Civil Defense

The instrument provides for two further ways of estimating the assumed importance or unimportance of Civil Defense programs. For one the respondents are asked to select the two most important problems which face the nation and the problem they think least important. A list of nine alternatives is provided. Second, the interviewees are asked to rate as very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant or very unimportant each of eight programs which entail substantial expenditures of Federal funds.

(a) Providing protection for the nation's citizens in the event of nuclear attack is considered a major national problem by very few respondent .

Respondents Who Select "Protection"

Most Important	1.5%
Second Most Important	5.5
Least Important	14.0

(b) The spread of world Communism is considered the most important national problem.

Spread of Communism

Most Important	25.5%
Second Most Important	15.9
Least Important	4.1

(c) Avoidance of a nuclear war is considered a close second in importance to the spread of world Communism.

Avoidance of War

Most Important	24.8%
Second Most Important	14.2
Least Important	4.8

(d) The race relations problem is the third most frequently selected national dilemma.

Race Relations

Most Important	14.5%
Second Most Important	18.3
Least Important	9.4

(e) A summary view of the basic results is given by considering the overall percentage of respondents who select a particular problem among the top two: Civil Defense programs fail to be included among the major issues. High taxes are by far the least important problem, however,

	Selected as First <u>or</u> Second Problem	Selected as Least Problem
Spread of Communism	41.4%	4.1%
Avoidance of nuclear war	39.0	4.8
Race relations	32.8	9.4
World poverty	24.9	11.7
Domestic Communism	20.1	6.5
Juvenile Delinquency	12.8	9.4
Crime	11.6	7.9
High taxes	10.4	32.1
Civil Defense	7.0	14.0

(f) Among programs which compete before Congress for financial support, Civil Defense efforts are viewed less important than national health programs and programs of aid to higher education but more important than other selected programs. The question stated:

"Various national programs frequently compete before Congress for financial support. I would like to ask your opinion about the programs which are listed on this card. Please keep in mind that it is unlikely that enough funds will be available for all of them. Will you please tell me if you think it is very important that funds be supplied for a program, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant or very unimportant."

Programs	Very Important or Somewhat Important	Very Unimportant or Somewhat Unimportant
National Health	95.3%	4.7%
Aid to Higher Education	93.9	6.1
Civil Defense	89.5	10.6
War on Poverty	80.4	19.6
Mass Public Transportation	68.5	31.5
Aid to Developing Nations	66.3	33.7
Space Exploration	61.6	38.4
Underseas Exploration	55.5	44.5

(g) Some 89.5 percent of the respondents claim it important that funds be provided for a Civil Defense program. This includes 56.5 percent of interviewees who believe this to be very important and 33.0 percent who consider this somewhat important.

(h) If only the "very important" ratings are taken into account, the Civil Defense option is still second only to aid to higher education (68.8 percent consider this very important) and to national health programs (65.2 percent in the "very important" category).

4. Effectiveness of Fallout Shelters

The instruments include a number of items which jointly bear directly on estimated effectiveness of fallout shelters. The respondents are asked whether they believe themselves to live in an area which would be a target in the event of a war. They are asked whether they might survive a nuclear war should it start "next week." They estimate the danger from fallout on the premise that their area might avoid destruction in the attack as such. They are asked to assess the survival chances of people in the area if they should be in fallout shelters.

(a) In 1966, about as many respondents as in 1964 believe that they live in prime target areas.

Area as Target	<u>1966</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1963*</u>
Certain danger	21.0%	21.6%	14.4%
Great danger	31.4	32.2	31.9
Some danger	26.2	26.9	23.7
Little danger	16.3	13.7	15.5
No danger at all	4.4	4.3	14.4

* Bureau of Applied Social Research study.

(b) Under conditions of attack, most Americans consider survival chances to be fifty-fifty or less.

Survival Odds	<u>1966</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1963*</u>
Very good	5.2%	4.7%	2.2%
Fairly good	24.8	21.2	22.8
Fifty-fifty	13.0	11.3	10.9
Fairly bad	22.9	21.0	20.6
Very bad	29.9	34.7	36.9
No chance at all	4.3	6.9	6.5

*BASR study

(c) If the local area were not destroyed during the attack, the danger of fallout is considered consistently great.

Fallout Danger	<u>1966</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1963*</u>
Very great	38.7%	34.5%	54.4
Fairly great	41.6	45.5	34.4
Little danger	18.2	18.4	11.1
No danger	1.4	1.5	--

*BASR study

(d) If people were in fallout shelters, the survival chances are believed to be considerably better than the corresponding survival odds without the sheltering premise. By 1966, people are actually more optimistic about their survival odds in shelters than they were in 1964 and again in 1963.

Survival Chances	<u>1966</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1963*</u>
Very good	22.5%	18.4%	18.5%
Fairly good	46.9	47.4	39.1
Fifty-fifty	14.1	13.6	13.0
Fairly bad	8.1	10.6	15.2
Very bad	6.7	8.0	11.9
No chance at all	1.6	1.8	2.2

* BASR study

(e) Asked for a summary evaluation of public fallout shelters, almost nine in ten Americans express themselves favorably.

Strongly favor	48.5%
Somewhat favor	38.2
Somewhat opposed	9.0
Strongly opposed	4.4

5. Civil Defense and the International Environment

The respondents were asked whether Civil Defense measures, particularly fallout shelters, enhance the concern with nuclear warfare. They were asked whether disarmament is made more or less difficult and a major war more or less probable. Ten major arguments about Civil Defense were postulated, and the interviewees were requested to express their agreement-disagreement with each statement. Finally, we sought to probe about the effects of the conflict in Vietnam upon the nation's concern with Civil Defense.

(a) In 1966, fewer Americans believe that fallout shelters make people worry about the possibility of war than did in 1964.

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1964</u>
Worry more	29.3%	37.1%
No difference	46.6	42.8
Worry less	24.1	20.1

(b) While three in ten respondents believe that people might be more worried about the prospects of a major war as a consequence of (fallout) shelter programs, and one in four think that shelters make people worry less, the respondents claim themselves, personally, to be much less sensitive to the impact of shelters than they tend to attribute to others.

Worry	<u>People*</u>	<u>Respondents*</u>
More	29.3%	13.1%
No difference	46.6	38.6
Less	24.1	18.3

* The interviewees are asked whether "people" get more-less worried, and again, whether they personally get more-less worried.

(c) Civil Defense measures, as before, are seen unrelated to potential difficulties of obtaining viable agreements on the disarmament front. If anything, the 1966 respondents agree more frequently than in prior inquiries that fallout shelters simply make no difference with regard to disarmament prospects.

<u>Disarmament</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1964</u>
More difficult	9.3%	11.5%
No difference	84.2	80.0
Less difficult	6.6	8.5

(d) Similar results are obtained with respect to the question on the effects of Civil Defense on war probabilities.

<u>War</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1964</u>
More likely	7.6%	9.0%
No difference	85.3	78.6
Less likely	7.1	12.4

(e) Most Americans, more than six in ten, do not think that Civil Defense programs would make Russians believe that the United States is preparing for war.

Strongly agree	7.6	37.2%
Agree	29.6	
Disagree	50.9	12.9
Strongly disagree	12.0	

(f) There is consensus on the life-saving potential of Civil Defense. The question stated:

"A Civil Defense program could save many American lives if a nuclear attack took place."

Strongly agree	52.1	93.4%
Agree	41.3	
Disagree	5.0	6.6
Strongly disagree	1.6	

(g) Most Americans do not feel that an "adequate Civil Defense program would be too expensive."

Strongly agree	11.9	38.9%
Agree	27.0	
Disagree	46.9	61.1
Strongly disagree	14.2	

(h) Only one in twenty respondents agree with the idea that there might be no need at all for Civil Defense measures because a nuclear war is, in fact, impossible anyway.

Strongly agree	1.1	4.8%
Agree	3.7	
Disagree	46.1	95.3
Strongly disagree	49.2	

(i) Two in three Americans subscribe to a degree of deterrent potential for Civil Defense. They agree that such programs might, in fact, "indicate to a potential enemy that we couldn't be pushed around in a showdown."

Strongly agree	19.5	67.6%
Agree	48.0	
Disagree	25.4	32.4
Strongly disagree	7.0	

(j) Only one in ten respondents believe that there is actually no need for Civil Defense against nuclear war because our defenses are already adequate.

Strongly agree	1.5	9.1%
Agree	7.6	
Disagree	56.8	90.9
Strongly disagree	34.1	

(k) This implicit approval of Civil Defense systems is not based on the feeling that the nation's defenses are poor and therefore, Civil Defense measures are needed due to the inadequacies of other systems. The 1964 study shows the conviction that the nation's defenses are actually very good.

(1964)	Defenses against bombers	8.22*
	Defenses against missiles	7.07*
	Defenses against submarines	7.39*

* Averages on a 0-10 scale evaluating quality of our defenses.

(l) There exists extreme consensus on the contribution of Civil Defense systems in coping with natural disasters under peacetime conditions.

"In addition to providing protection in event of a nuclear war, a Civil Defense program could also be very useful in coping with natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes."

Strongly agree	42.6	94.4%
Agree	51.8	
Disagree	4.2	5.6
Strongly disagree	1.4	

(m) Americans do not think that a national program of Civil Defense would be viewed as "selfish" by other nations.

Strongly agree	1.7	
Agree	16.8	18.5%
Disagree	62.1	
Strongly disagree	19.4	81.5

(n) About one in nine Americans subscribe to the notion that "money that might be spent on Civil Defense would be better invested in more bombers and missiles." Further buildup of strategic forces as an alternative is thus not considered a particularly desirable option.

Strongly agree	1.9	
Agree	12.3	14.7%
Disagree	62.3	
Strongly disagree	22.5	85.3

(o) One in five respondents feel, however, that there "is no defense possible in the event of nuclear war."

Strongly agree	6.6	
Agree	14.2	20.8%
Disagree	57.4	
Strongly disagree	21.8	79.2

(p) Almost four in ten interviewees claim that they have become concerned "about an improved Civil Defense program for (their) community" as a consequence of the state of affairs in Vietnam.

More concerned	38.9%
No difference	58.9
Less concerned	2.2

(q) As a consequence of the Cuban crisis, 34.6 percent of the 1963 respondents claimed that their attitude toward Civil Defense became either much more favorable or more favorable. Some 2.1 percent argued that their feelings became more unfavorable or much more unfavorable.

6. Civil Defense Participation

In the 1966 study, the respondents were asked whether they might be willing to volunteer to participate in a community Civil Defense program; they were asked whether, by any chance, they have a private (family) shelter at their place of residence; and whether

they have set up some specific area or place in their home to be used in case of nuclear attack.

(a) Some 62.4 percent of the respondents claim that they would be willing to volunteer for participation in their local Civil Defense program. Of these respondents, 23.5 percent say that they would definitely volunteer, whereas the remainder (38.9 percent) would probably participate.

Definitely volunteer	23.5%
Probably volunteer	38.9
Undecided	9.0
Probably not volunteer	20.5
Definitely not volunteer	8.1

(b) In the 1954 University of Michigan inquiry, 68 percent of the respondents gave a "yes" or "qualified yes" answer to a question whether they would be willing to give a few hours a week to learn about Civil Defense; in 1952, 60 percent responded in this manner.

(c) The percentage of homes with fallout shelters is somewhat higher in 1966 than in 1963 or in 1961.

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1961*</u>
Private shelters	3.5%	2.2%	1.4%

* Michigan State study of eight cities.

(d) Quite a few Americans claim to have designated some area or place in their home to be used in the event of a nuclear attack. While 66.6 percent of the respondents say that they have done nothing of the sort, 29.7 percent give an affirmative answer. In the 1963 survey, 24.9 percent of the interviewees asserted that they are protected in some way against nuclear attack, and 18.5 percent (76.0 percent of the 24.9 percent previously cited) said that the protection consisted of an impromptu shelter in their own house.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this section of the report, consideration will be given only to those ramifications of the data which have a bearing on programs of civil defense. Thus we shall not seek to evaluate the further implications of the cold war conflict per se, or of the war in Vietnam in its own right.

Over the many years of civil defense-related research, 1950-1966, the data show remarkable consistency in public evaluations of the programs. All along, Americans have been highly supportive of civil defense and actual expressions of opposition have remained at around the ten percent level. Throughout, between two in three and nine in ten of our citizens have gone on record as favoring measures of civil defense.

This amounts to a form of "national consensus," with stability over time, in both major ways in which we like to think of the concept. For one, two-thirds majorities are sufficient in our political process to arrive even at the most exacting decisions: such are the majorities in support of civil defense. Secondly, no single group of Americans or some relevant social category can be singled out as standing in opposition and thus essentially against the overwhelming numerical majority. Neither support nor opposition are clearly patterned in that it is impossible to identify any segment of our body politic and make it coincident with the occurrence of negative sentiments vis-a-vis civil defense.

Of course, some population segments are overrepresented in their positive sentiments, such as younger people, or women, or Negroes, or working class Americans. But the differences are in the intensity of their favorableness rather than in its direction.

Nor are the forms of opposition and support apparently patterned by expectations or desirabilities associated with the termination possibilities of the cold war. This may be accounted for by the fact that highly desirable outcomes are not seen very probable (e.g., disarmament), and highly unwanted outcomes are not exceptionally improbable (e.g., a central war). Be that as it may, anticipations--when viewed as both probabilities and desirabilities--regarding the ending of the cold war do not predict the direction of responses to programs of civil defense. The pattern of overall favorableness is as strong among Americans fervently desirous of disarmament as it is among others. Indeed, this may be further reenforced by the consensus which prevails with regard to the important role of civil defense against hazards of nature and man-made disasters short of the possible nuclear cataclysm.

In one sense, however, the positive and negative responses are patterned indeed: by far most Americans who are favorable to any program of civil defense tend to be favorable to all alternative ones although the intensity of their feeling may occasionally vary; and those relatively few Americans who are opposed to civil defense, tend to be opposed to all measures of civil defense and not just to particular systems (e.g., private versus public fallout shelters; fallout versus blast shelters; protection versus evacuation).

We cannot but conclude: there is little reason to suppose that the number of opponents of civil defense programs will grow almost regardless of how opposition arguments are stated or enacted; there is little reason to suppose that the level of support will increase, simply because a kind of "ceiling" seems already operative. There just are not many more "friends" for civil defense to be gained; and there are few "opponents" who could be converted--precisely because the unfavorable sentiments are more general in character and not specific to particular features of particular civil defense systems. This should not be construed to mean that the level of activity of supporters or of opponents or both could not undergo fairly drastic changes, and we shall deal with this problem subsequently. But it does mean that the basic attitudes will remain just about the same with minor oscillations back and forth and whatever activism makes itself felt, it will draw upon the already prevalent sentiments rather than importantly changing them (in either direction).

The basic consistency of positive American attitudes toward civil defense is, in many ways, quite remarkable. Apparently, it has not been affected by the fluctuations in the international environment. Thus it has remained stable in a world of the Korean conflict, development of Soviet thermonuclear weapons, Hungarian revolution, Berlin wall, Chinese occupation of Tibet, Chinese invasion of India, the coming of Castroist Cuba, the Cuban missile crisis, the gradual escalation of the Vietnamese war, and China's developments on the nuclear weapons front.

In acute crises, the predominant pattern of attitudes gives rise to heightened activity: there is some increase in shelter building and in family shelter planning; there is a considerable increase in requests for specific information concerning protective behavior in the event of nuclear war, and so on. The Berlin wall and the Cuban quarantine crises are quite typical of this class of events. But the activism subsides as soon as it seems apparent that the anticipated outbreak of hostilities might not come about and as soon as some degree of normalcy, even at a new level of conflict, takes place.

The underlying evaluations of civil defense have also been unaffected by changes in the nation's administration. The same sentiments seem to prevail in the days of Johnson as did in the Kennedy era, in the years of Eisenhower, and in the remaining months of the Truman Presidency. Nor have shifts in Soviet leadership had a great effect. The results for Stalin's regime are not different from the findings of the triumvirate days (Khrushchev, Malenkov, Bulganin) of the Khrushchev interregnum, and of the Brezhnev-Kosygin age.

It may well be that relative lack of information about the Soviet leadership may explain the insensitiveness of the data to such changes. But the same cannot be easily argued about changes in domestic leadership and the impressive increments in, and diversification of, the nation's military establishment. Yet, the same kinds of beliefs about civil defense prevail now as did in previous times.

There are compelling reasons to argue that the fundamental assessments of civil defense will remain impervious to further changes in the international climate. This means that subsequent escalation, or for that matter, deescalation, of the conflict in Vietnam is unlikely to lead to different data concerning civil defense from the information we have to date. Nor will further modest steps on the arms control and disarmament spectrum, such as the recently negotiated treaty concerning weapons testing in outer space, or a plausible treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, change these views. The 1963 test ban treaty similarly had no profound effects on the expressed attitudes and dispositions.

At the same time, certain classes of events might induce great increments in activity related to programs of civil defense. For example, we would expect a temporary increase in the nation's civil defense-relevant activism should China get involved in the Vietnamese war at least to the extent of that country's involvement in Korea. But as soon as it were clear that the implicit threat is unlikely to actualize and a larger war is not imminent, the sense of urgency is likely to subside, and with it, the level of active participation and involvement.

Hence, the attitudes lead to different commitments to action depending on the character of the international environment. A low level of activity is typical when most shifts in the international scene are gradual, and as long as conflict patterns are chronic. A high level of activity is more predictable when extreme and rapid changes take place which either sharply increase the seeming probability of war, or increase the uncertainty about the future.

The nation's feelings about civil defense have not undergone significant changes even in the context of major shifts in the civil defense programs themselves. There are no noticeable frequencies of conversions of opponents into proponents and vice versa in the face of changes from evacuation plans to stress on family shelters to an emphasis on the construction of public fallout shelters to marking and stocking programs based on surveys of available sheltering.

Indeed, even though significant increments in civil defense readiness have been achieved through such modest programs, as well as rather widespread training and education efforts, both arguments of supporters and the arguments of opponents remain largely unaffected. This means, of course, that we do not expect that current and subsequent efforts will have a different impact either. Neither the Home Shelter Survey Program nor the Community Shelter Planning Program should be expected to alter the pattern of the nation's thinking, and since most of the thinking is highly positive, little difficulty can be expected in connection with the implementation of such programs. In a similar vein, we do not think that the evidence would warrant the conclusion that a national decision to go ahead with anti-missile missile systems would make Americans less receptive to civil defense and passive defense systems. Nor would we claim that they would become more receptive than they already are.

The nation's mass media, particularly newspapers and magazines, have given civil defense at least as much bad publicity as they have been somewhat more positive. Indeed, negative reporting has tended to be somewhat predominant. Despite this, the views of Americans about civil defense have remained just about the same over the years.

Over two thousand organizations in the country claim to be "peace organizations" with a dedication of the pursuit of paths toward peaceable settlement of world problems. Of these, hundreds have been quite active with respect to various national and international issues. Many have linked programs of civil defense to militarism, to war-mongering, to aggressiveness, and have sought to promulgate an unfavorable image of civil defense. The nation's sentiments have not been altered in the process.

The favorable viewpoint has been independent of the manner in which the various questions have been worded, and the kinds of responses which were implicit in the questions. Asked whether they want civil defense, or more of a program than at any given time seems to exist, Americans give a strong affirmative answer. Probed whether they are favorable or unfavorable to civil defense in general, or to fallout shelter programs, they select favorable

alternatives. Asked whether they agree or disagree with civil defense measures, the respondents choose to agree, and usually quite strongly so. Asked about the desirability of civil defense measures, desirable responses dominate undesirable ones in a ratio similar to other response patterns. Different basic sampling designs, probability samples or block samples, produce essentially identical results as well. Thus the consistent pattern of evaluations cannot be attributed to characteristics of particular research designs or to particular research instruments.

There can be no question that civil defense actually fares very well with our body politic. This seems enough to indicate that as long as the risk of war persists, the need for civilian preparedness will remain altogether apparent to our public, the desirability of actual steps toward enhanced readiness will be maintained at a high level, and arguments about negative psychological, social and international costs of taking such measures will remain unacceptable, or perhaps, not credible.

The actual assessment of war probabilities, however, has bearing on the sense of urgency with which advances on the civil defense front tend to be viewed. Under acute threat, this feeling of urgency translates itself into action. Under conditions of high tension but in face of no seeming increment in war probabilities, the "normalcy" situation does not dictate such direct involvement although favorable sentiments and attitudes are maintained, and receptivity to civil defense programs remains high.

What are some of the implications of these findings? In a situation in which the question is often asked as to how to make civil defense "acceptable" to our people, these might sound like unexpected results. However, they are less surprising than the persistency with which the question is asked in face of overwhelming and repeated evidence that it need not be raised at all. This means, of course, that public education and information programs to essentially "sell" civil defense as such are probably not worth the cost not because it is difficult to convince people of the value of the effort, but because they already are convinced of it. Any increments in the level of attitudinal support can be only negligible due to the already existing support "ceiling."

We see, furthermore, no educational or informational program which would convert the few, if vigorous, opponents. This is so simply because the opposition sentiments are couched in a broader ideological conception of the world; because the unfavorable sentiments are independent of the kind of civil defense effort undertaken and encompass all of them; because the negative attitudes have been maintained in about the same

proportion of Americans in the face of changing international scenes, changing domestic as well as Soviet leadership, and changing programs of civil defense.

Yet, when opposition arguments do come into the open, it may well be crucial to enlighten the public about the fact that such views characterize but a fragment of our society, not negligible but nonetheless small. This seems important mainly because an individual who has a rather favorable view of civil defense may feel in a minority in face of strong, organized and vocal opposition. No one can really convince Americans that civil defense programs are, or are not, provocative to the Soviets. This is simply due to the fact that Soviet interpretations of world affairs are not very well known to us no matter how much we would like to say that they are, and thus no proof can be provided one way or another. However, it is quite possible and useful to assert that only a few Americans actually believe that civil defense programs are provocative to the Soviets whether, in fact, they are or are not.

Under conditions of relative "normalcy"--a notion which encompasses changing international tensions, chronic conflict patterns, and many modest oscillations of the conflict level--the nation's body politic is not highly sensitive to civil defense-related activity of any kind. This implies that the low sense of urgency has an impact on the willingness of the public to acquire information which might be vital to increase personal, family and national survival under actual conditions of nuclear hazards. This is a veritable dilemma. For we are led to conclude that no information program can significantly increase the nation's knowledge about warning, about protective behavior, about recovery requirements, in such "normal" environments since the relevance of the information to immediate life situations of most people is quite remote. Perhaps the only kind of information program that has saliency in a time-less sense is the one which keeps educating our people about ways in which relevant information could be obtained in an immediate pre-attack environment, and that such information is available and will be made available.

This also implies that we cannot expect, in the more "normal" international climates, that the public would begin levying demands on the nation's political leaders to enhance civilian readiness. In this situation, we see no rationale which would induce Americans to attempt to trigger off more active pressures for more civil defense at the national, or state, or local levels. This makes the task for policy makers particularly exacting and difficult since, in the area of civil defense as in many others, they must truly lead rather than respond

to expressed national demands. Furthermore, even if the level of public activity were increased--as in crises environments--it is not altogether clear whether we would be ready with plans to respond to popular demands, to utilize large masses of volunteers, to launch immediate programs. This, in turn, means that crises, as unwanted as they are in any event, are opportunities from the vantage point of civil defense measures. But they are possibilities rather than genuine opportunities until such time as national planning has reached a stage of preparedness for crises, and particularly, preparedness for a nationwide response to crises.

All in all, this further leads to stressing the necessity for contingent planning such that crisis situations, if they occur, can be made use of in a positive sense. This is easier said than done. Certain situations are crises or "acute" problems precisely because they represent a qualitatively different level of international threat. It is not altogether certain whether, in such circumstances, some forms of civil defense mobilization would not aggravate the crisis itself. But these are problems of national policy to which we are not addressing ourselves, and such dilemmas in no way negate the obvious desirability of planning even if the crisis-related plans were never carried out.

Now the data strongly suggest still another conclusion. If simple behavior is expected and sought of our people, compliance can be anticipated at the levels commensurate with the research findings: that is, at least two in three and as many as nine in ten of our people will generally act in the desired manner. Now behavior is "simple" in this sense if it calls for relatively direct actions or short, and rather self-explanatory, action processes which do not entail the use of a great deal of time, energy or funding. Furthermore, it is "simple" if the end-products of the behavior are clearly visible so that the acting individual himself has a good feeling for the relation between the ends of his actions and the actions themselves as means toward such ends. Thus, if the actions seem to "make sense."

This should account for the expectations and, in the states thus far surveyed, the fact of high compliance with such programs as the Home Shelter Survey. It levies simple requirements. The objective is obvious. The time and energy investments of each individual involved in the survey are low.

The same conclusion also accounts for the rather high compliance of the nation's landlords with the Marking and Stocking Program. The logic of the effort is both simple and compelling

and the grounds for non-compliance--certainly on the basis of opposition to civil defense--rather few.

A call for volunteers which would specify the concrete activities of volunteers, the time and energy involvement expected of them, a simple procedure for volunteering and for discontinuing their activities, would similarly be heeded by large numbers of Americans. A personalized call for volunteers would lead to as high a level of compliance as our data indicate--with as many as seven in ten of the Americans approached willing to devote some of their time to concrete civil defense activities.

On the other hand, a call for volunteers which would simply assert that "civil defense needs volunteers" would lead to results which cannot be forecasted on the basis of any known data, but the numbers of volunteers can safely be expected to be quite low. For such a generalized appeal assumes far too much of each individual long before he actually would choose to volunteer: each individual would have to find out various details of the program (and that takes time and energy; it also takes knowing about sources of such information, and so on), fit these pieces of information into his life pattern, and make a decision about his desire to participate. The time-energy investments and the necessary time-delays in each step would cut into the compliance action quite heavily. However, a generalized call for volunteers under crises conditions would probably parallel the responses to a personalized call under conditions of "normalcy."

Now the same applies to the former family shelter program. Far too much was demanded of each American family, in the way of a search for information, its evaluation, planning, financing, buying and building or contracting to have built, and so on. We suggest that the program was less than a great success not because of the opposition of Americans to shelters, but because it did not call for a "simple" but rather exceptionally "complex" form of compliance.

Whether some of these forecasts or interpretations are valid or not remains, in part, to be seen. But they are, at least, subject to validation. We have accepted the risk of being wrong and sought to impute the "meaning" of some of the data from years of research. This reflects our view that we already know a great deal about the nation facing the potential of thermo-nuclear disaster.

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<p>The purpose of this report is to examine Americans' views on civil defense in the 1966 cold war context from the point of view of the fundamental patterns and meanings of <u>all</u> available information and from the point of view of evaluating specific items of information. The 1966 data were obtained from a national sample of 1,497 Americans interviewed in February and March, 1966. In many cases, data are presented with comparable data from previous studies. There is a form of "national consensus," with stability over time, in support of civil defense, and it is impossible to identify any particular segment of the population who express negative sentiments. The basic consistency in positive attitudes apparently has not been affected by fluctuations in the international environment, changes in the nation's administration, or shifts in Soviet leadership. Nor have major shifts in the civil defense programs themselves affected the national sentiment. Americans are convinced that survival odds would be greatly enhanced for a sheltered population. The shelter assignment notion meets with very little negative feeling. The home shelter survey idea is very well received. Americans see a significant role for civil defense in natural disaster and other emergency situations. While Americans do not consider civil defense to be among the most important problems facing the nation, among programs competing before Congress for financial support, civil defense is second only to higher education and national health programs.</p>	

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KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
Shelter assignment Home shelter survey Civil defense policy Civil defense information programs						

INSTRUCTIONS

1. **ORIGINATING ACTIVITY:** Enter the name and address of the contractor, subcontractor, grantee, Department of Defense activity or other organization (corporate author) issuing the report.

2a. **REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION:** Enter the overall security classification of the report. Indicate whether "Restricted Data" is included. Marking is to be in accordance with appropriate security regulations.

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4. **DESCRIPTIVE NOTES:** If appropriate, enter the type of report, e.g., interim, progress, summary, annual, or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.

5. **AUTHOR(S):** Enter the name(s) of author(s) as shown on the report. Enter last name, first name, middle initial. If military, show rank and branch of service. The name of the principal author is an absolute minimum requirement.

6. **REPORT DATE:** Enter the date of the report as day, month, year, or month, year. If more than one date appears in the report, use date of publication.

7. **TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES:** The total page count should follow normal pagination procedures, i.e., enter the number of pages containing information.

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There is no limitation on the length of the abstract. However, the suggested length is from 150 to 225 words.

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